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Summary findings
An earlier Policy  Research Working Paper (Hennie van  and judicial processes-being  addressed by government
Greuning, Joselito Gallardo,  and Bikki Randhawa,  "A  authorities and microfinance  stakeholders  in both
Framework for Regulating Microfinance  Institutions,"  countries. He gives  particular attention to the thresholds
WPS  2061, February  1999) presented a regulatory  at which intermediation  activities become subject to
framework that identifies thresholds  in financial  prudential regulation and regulatory standards for
intermediation activities that trigger a requirement  for a  capitalization  and capital  adequacy,  asset quality  and
microfinance institution  to satisfy external  or mandatory  provisioning for nonperforming loans,  and liquidity
guidelines-a tiered approach to regulation and  management.
prudential supervision.  The model focuses on risk-taking  Gallardo seeks  to identify the key elements and
activities of microfinance  institutions that must be  characteristics  of the microfinance  regulatory experience
managed and prudentially  regulated.  of Ghana  and the Philippines  and to draw the lessons
Gallardo reports on the results of the field testing and  that may be useful for other countries interested in
assessment of the tiered  approach,  focusing on the  establishing  a regulatory environment conducive  to the
experience  of Ghana and the Philippines.  The two  development of sustainable  microfinance  institutions.
countries both have  a wide  range of informal, semi-  The experience  of Ghana  and the Philippines shows
formal,  and formal  institutions providing financial  that a transparent, inclusive  regulatory framework  is
services  to the poor, but differ in how they regulate  indispensable  for enabling microfinance institutions  to
financial  intermediation activities by microfinance  maintain  market specialization  and to pursue
providers.  institutional  development that leads to sustainability.
In his assessment  and a comparative  analysis, Gallardo  Clear pathways for institutional transformation  facilitate
focuses on key issues in the regulatory  and supervisory  the integration of microfinance  institutions  into the
environment  for microfinance-and in the legal system  formal  financial system.
This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Development Department-is part of a larger effort  in the department to
explore ways to provide  more financial services  to the poor. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank,
1818  H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Tomoko Ishibe, room MC9-747, telephone  202-473-8968,
fax 202-522-3198, email address tishibe@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted  on the Web at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author may be contacted  at jgallardo@worldbank.org.  January 2002.  (36 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An  objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
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Responding to the rapid growth of various types microfinance  institutions (MFIs)  around  the world  and the
gap in knowledge on whether and  how these institutions should be regulated,  a team from the World Bank
comprising  Hennie  van  Greuning,  Joselito  Gallardo  and  Bikki  Randhawa  produced  a Policy  Research
Working  Paper  No.  2061  (February  1999)  entitled,  "A  Framework for  Regulating  Microfinance
Institutions". The paper sought to provide a framework  for addressing  regulatory  issues which impact the
operations  and  the institutional  development  of MFIs.  The paper  was  viewed  as  a  work in progress  on
which further adjustments could be made, based on analysis  of selected  country experiences  from the field.
The  two  countries  selected  for this  field testing  and  assessment  were  Ghana  and  the Philippines,  which
have a  wide  range of informal,  semi-formal  and formal  MFIs providing  financial services  to the poor, but
have  legal systems  and  regulatory  frameworks  which  differ  in how financial  intermediation  activities  by
MFIs  are regulated  and/or  supervised.  Subsequent  in-depth  work  on issues  in  developing  sustainable
rural/microfinance  in  Indonesia presented  an  opportunity  to deepen  the  assessment  of how  the legal  and
regulatory  environment  is important to sustainable  microfinance.
The  assessment  and  comparative  analysis  carried  out  focus  on  the  key  issues  in  the  legal  system  and
judicial  processes,  as  well  as on  the regulatory  and  supervisory  environment  for microfinance  which  are
being addressed by the governments  and microfinance  stakeholders in the countries.
Ghana,  the Philippines  and  Indonesia  all have  a  comparatively  wide  range of informal,  semi-formal  and
formal institutions whose principal line of business is the provision of microfinance  services.  The legal and
regulatory  environment  in  these  three  countries  have,  for  many  years,  permitted  the  establishment  of
specialized banking and financial  institutions  with limited financial  intermediation services to geographical
areas with defined  limits.  In more recent years,  the government  authorities  in Ghana  and the Philippines
have moved  forward to articulate a  vision and strategy  for microfinance  and its role in  poverty alleviation
programs,  and made  corresponding  adjustments  in their banking and financial  laws  and regulations  to take
advantage of the outreach possible through MFIs.
The  tiered  regulatory  approach  has clearly  benefited  the  development of sustainable  microfinance  in the
Philippines  and  Ghana,  by  clearly  identifying  pathways  for non-government  organizations  (NGOs)  and
semi-formal  MFIs to become  legitimate  institutions under the regulatory  framework  with greater ability to
access  financial  resources  from  commercial  markets.  Among  the  risks  that  a  graduated  and  tiered
regulatory  framework  might  present  is  that  of regulatory  arbitrage,  whereby  organizers  of  a  financial
institution seeking  a license might choose to be constituted under an institutional format which is subject to
least possible external  regulation  and supervision,  as well as the lowest possible amount of capitalization  at
entry.  Regulatory  arbitrage  does not  appear to have  been  experienced  by  the Philippines or Ghana  with
respect to the MFIs obtaining status as licensed  specialized  banks.
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1.  In response  to the rapid growth  of various  types  microfinance  institutions  (MFIs)  around  the world
and the gap in knowledge  on whether and how these institutions should be regulated,  a team from the
World  Bank  comprising  Hennie  van  Greuning,  Joselito  Gallardo  and  Bikki  Randhawa  produced  a
Policy  Research  Working Paper,  No.  2061  (February  1999)  entitled,  "A Framework for Regulating
Microfinance Institutions".  The  paper  sought  to  provide  a  framework  for addressing  regulatory
issues which impact the operations  and the institutional development of MFIs.
2.  That  Policy  Research  Paper has  been  widely  disseminated  internally  among  staff within the  World
Bank as  well  as externally  to its  client countries,  other donor agencies  and network organizations  of
MFIs.  The feedback  received  has  been very favorable  on the  innovative  framework  proposed.  The
framework  discussed  in  the  paper  has  been  used  for  training  purposes  both  within  the Bank  and
outside.
II  OBJECTIVES AND Focus ON THE ASSESSMENT AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
3.  The  country  case  studies  are  an  opportunity  for  in-depth  comparative  analysis  of  the  countries'
experiences  in  implementing  a  microfinance  regulatory  framework,  and  thus  provide  a  basis  for
refining  the  framework  itself.  The  criteria  used  in  selecting  the  countries  are:  (a)  existence  of a
significant  microfinance  industry  and  a  variety  of  semi-informal  and  formal  channels  for
microfinance,  and (b) ongoing  dialogue among microfinance  stakeholders  on issues in the  legal  and
regulatory  framework for microfinance.
4.  The  two  countries  selected  for  this  field  testing  and  assessment  are  Ghana  and  the  Philippines.
Subsequent  in-depth  work  on  issues  in  developing  sustainable  rural/microfinance  in  Indonesia
presented  a singular opportunity  to deepen the assessment  of the legal and regulatory  environments  in
Ghana  and the Philippines  by bringing in relevant  aspects  of the  Indonesian  experience.  All  three
countries - Ghana,  the Philippines, and Indonesia - have  a wide range  of informal,  semi-formal  and
formal  MFIs providing different financial services to the poor, as well as legal systems  and regulatory
frameworks  which differ in coverage  of financial intermediation activities  by MFIs.
5.  The  assessment and  comparative  analysis  carried out  focus  on the  following  key issues  in the legal
system and  judicial environment:
*  Procedures  and requirements  for legitimizing  status  as an MFI, such as organizational  format  for
becoming established,  and rules and regulations  for registration.
*  Standards to be met and requirements  to be complied  with  in order to obtain status  as a licensed
microfinance institution,  including the range of institutional  formats within a tiered structure.
*  Procedures  stipulated  and requirements  to be satisfied  in order to access  non-deposit  wholesale
commercial  funds,  e.g.,  through large-value  certificates  of deposit,  commercial  paper  issues  or
securitized instruments.
*  Characteristics  of the legal  structure  and judicial  system which  permit or prevent  assets to carry
the burden of debt.
6.  The  assessment  and  comparative  analysis  carried  out  focus  on  the  following  key  issues  in  the
regulatory and supervisory environment:
*  The  principal  prudential  standards  required  to  be  observed  and  complied  with by  licensed  or
1authorized banking and financial  intermediary institutions.
*  The primary  methods  by which  observance  and compliance are  carried out, including frequency
of offsite mandatory reports and onsite examination.
*  Sanctions  and penalties for non-observance  or non-compliance.
*  Rules for entry and exit as licensed banking and financial intermediary institutions.
III  NEW DIRECTIONS IN PROVIDING MICROFINANCE  SERVICES:
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE
7.  The  late  1970s  witnessed  a  growth  in  financial  services  targeted  to the  poor,  through  initiatives
spearheaded  by  NGOs  such  as  Grameen  Bank  in  Bangladesh  and  the  affiliates  of  ACCION
International  in Latin  America.  These  initiatives  were  followed  in the  1980s by  major efforts  of
ACCION  and other NGO networks  such as Women's  World  Banking.  In addition,  the Foundation
for  International  Community  Assistance  (FINCA),  the Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement  Committee
(BRAC)  and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia  (BRI) Unit Desas (village banks) were reporting success  in
reaching the poor with financial  services.  During  this period of growth in the number  and range  of
MFIs, various myths about providing the poor with financial services  were dispelled  -- including  that
the poor cannot save  and cannot afford non-subsidized  interest  rates.  In the  1990s, best practices in
microfinance  made  important  strides  in such  areas  as  key  indicators  for  measuring  an institution's
success, particularly outreach and financial sustainability.
Box  1. Lessons  Learned from the Global Experience on Microfinance
*  The financial systems  approach is important for sustainable microfinance  with outreach.  The approach
emphasizes  an enabling  environment  for policy and regulation and supportive  financial  infrastructure.
The approach  also depends  on developing  a range of financial  intermediaries  committed  to achieving
financial  sustainability  within a reasonable  time,  and to providing a variety of financial services other
than credit.
*  The  diversity  of  demand  for  microfinance  services  requires  a  broad  range  of  strong  financial
intermediation institutions  which can expand outreach  to households  in different layers of poverty and
in resource-poor  urban and rural areas.
*  The primary concern  of microfinance  clients  is access  to microfinance  services  compatible  with their
requirements,  rather than the cost of such services.  Demand for savings  services by poor households
may be  as strong  as demand  for credit  facilities.  Thus, expanding  the access  to  savings services  can
have a significant impact on an institution's  sustainability.
*  Financially  viable  microfinance  institutions  limit  their operational  focus  to  providing  only financial
services.  It  is important  to  distinguish  between  and  to  separate  financial  intermediation  (through
microfinance)  vis-a-vis  social  intermediation  (through  social  safety  nets)  in  the  design  of  support
programs.
8.  The global  experience  demonstrates  that MFIs  change  and  develop  as  the scale and  scope  of their
operations  grow  beyond  delivery  of credit  services  to  include  savings,  deposit and  other financial
services.  In  addition,  that  growth  prompts  innovative  approaches  to  achieving  and  maintaining
financial  sustainability.  Expanding  outreach  requires  increasing  funding resources  and exposes  the
lirnits  to  grants  and  donor  funds.  Commercial  funding  sources  can  usually be  accessed  when  the
policy and legal environment are appropriate,  and only if the NEIl has the appropriate legal status and
financial  standing.
29.  In  Bolivia,  the  microfinance  NGO  Fundaci6n  para  la Promoci6n  y  Desarollo  de  la  Microempresa
(PRODEM)  sought  to  scale  up  and  transform  into  a  licensed  commercial  bank  in  order  to  fund
microfinance  operations from retail and  wholesale  deposits.  Through  BancoSol PRODEM was  able
to  quickly  expand  its  client  base  from  14,300  active/repeat  borrowers  in  four  PRODEM
branches/offices  in  1991  to  more  than  80,000  active  loan  accounts  and  50,000  savings  deposit
accounts in more  than  3  dozen branches/offices  of BancoSol  by  1998.  BancoSol  (Banco  Solidario,
S.A.  (Bolivia))has  captured  about  20%  of  Bolivia's  potential  market  for  microfinance.  The
PRODEM/Bancosol  experience induced  several developments  that have been beneficial for Bolivia's
poor households  and its microfinance  industry.'
•  First,  the  Bolivian  bank  regulatory  authority  recognized  the  importance  of  the  regulatory
environment  on microfinance  development  and made room for new category of regulated MFIs -
the Private Finance Fund.
*  Second,  BancoSol's  success  in  the banking  industry induced  other commercial  banks  to  adjust
their market positioning  and product offerings in order to compete with BancoSol.
*  Finally,  the successful  experience  encouraged  other Bolivian  NGO-MiFIs  such  as  AgroCapital
and ProMujer to develop  their own institutional transformation  to regulated institutions.
10.  The  successful  transformation  achieved  by  PRODEM/BancoSol  served  to  encourage  other  NGO-
MFIs around the world like K-REP (Kenya), ADEMI and ADOPEM  (Dominican Republic)  to design
their  own  transformation  to  gain  the  capability  to  fund  expansion  by  mobilizing  deposits  and
accessing  the  capital  markets.  Transformation  has  enabled  a  Philippine  NGO,  the  Center  for
Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (CARD),  to  move  its  client  base  of  23,000  women  in  rural
villages into its CARD  Rural Bank subsidiary  which has  expanded outreach  on  a sustainable basis to
almost 40,000 repeat borrowers and savers in less than four years.
11.  The Bangladesh MFI Grameen  Bank has  a very extensive  outreach.  Equally well known is  the unit
desa network  of BRI.  While  BRI  is  a  state-owned  commercial  bank,  the  unit desa microfinance
operation  has  had  the management  and operating  autonomy  typically  found  only  in private  sector-
owned banks - there are no subsidies from the central government,  and no cross-subsidies  from BRI's
other  commercial  banking  operations.  The  unit desa microfinance  system  has more  than  2 million
active  loan  accounts  and more  than  12  million  depositors.  In  many  respects,  Egypt  has  a  similar
approach  and experience  with the microfinance  program of its National Development  Bank.  In both
the  cases  of Indonesia  and Egypt,  it  is  important  to note  that (i)  the  microfinance  programs  in  the
state-owned  institutions were given management and operating  autonomy more commonly  associated
with  private  sector-owned  institutions;  and  (ii)  the  government  institutions  and  the  policy  that
informed the microfinance  operations eschewed  subsidy mechanisms.
12.  A  principal  lesson  from  the  experience  of successful  MFIs  in other  countries  is  the  importance  of
sequencing.  In this context,  the priority  area to address is the policy  environment,  legal  system and
regulatory  framework  for  microfinance.  When  the  vision  and  strategy  for  microfinance  are  well
defined  and articulated,  the capacity  development  needs  of different  microfinance  players  are more
easily identified  and an action program for building  up the institutional  capacity  crafted.  These prior
steps facilitate  the entry of donors who can focus their technical  assistance programs  to the identified
needs of players with the potential  for outreach  and financial  sustainability.
Reference:  From data and information available in various CGAP Focus Notes.
3IV  IMPACT OF THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ON SUSTAINABLE
MICROFINANCE
13.  Improving  the access  of low-income  producers  and the poor to basic financial  services  is viewed as
an  ingredient  of the World  Bank's  efforts  to  promote  economic  growth  and reduce  poverty.  The
World Bank's approach emphasizes a market-driven  approach in which the financial sustainability  of
financial  intermediaries becomes paramount.  In many cases that market approach is possible because
of the use by MFIs of group  lending and other techniques to offset borrowers'  lack of collateral.  The
World  Bank's  overall  strategy  for  helping  countries  develop  micro,  rural  and  small  and  medium
enterprise  (SME)  finance  includes  a number  of  key  measures  in  the  overall  legal  and  regulatory
framework,  in  building  up  institutional  capacity  and  in  the  introduction  of  financial  systems
infrastructure: 2
Box 2:  The World Bank's financial sector priorities for developing  microfmance
1.  Removing legal provisions (e.g., interest ceilings) or adapting regulatory provisions  (e.g., banking
regulations) inconsistent with financially sustainable  rural and micro finance.
2.  Establishing registration and titling systems and foreclosure  laws to allow the use of assets (lands,
crops, cattle,  small equipment) owned by rural and poor urban households  as loan collateral.
3.  Continuing  the development  of specialized  nonbank financial  intermediaries  (e.g.,  microfinance
institutions, leasing companies, private equity funds) for SME finance.
4.  Harnessing  modem  technologies  (electronic  banking,  credit  and  payment  cards)  and/or  non-
financial  institutions  (postal service)  to provide  basic, innovative payment  and financial  services
for rural areas, micro-enterprises  and SMEs.
Source:  "Strategyfor the Financial  Sector", Financial  Sector Board, The World Bank Washingion. DC, February  200.
14.  The regulation and supervision  of MFIs should be an  integral part of a strategy to develop a market-
based financial system.  Microfinance  is not limited  to borrowing,  but also includes  other financial
services  such  as  savings,  insurance,  transfer  facilities,  etc.  Savings  facilities  are  a  particularly
important  question  when  considering  prudential  regulation  of  MFIs  because  the  prospective
microfinance  target group is usually many times larger in deposit business than in lending.
15.  A clear  and transparent  regulatory  framework  is  necessary  because  MFIs'  traditional  fund  sources
usually cannot keep pace with their lending business, and thus need to have access  to external finance
to  complement  their  own  resources  and  those  from donors  in  order  to reach  as  many  prospective
borrowers  as possible.  Possible  sources of funds are loans from other financial  institutions,  private
savings  or - in  an advanced  microfinance  sector  - securities  issues  on  the  formal  capital  market.
MFIs  could  thereby  advance  from  credit-only  institutions  to  fully-fledged  financial  intermediaries.
Heretofore,  mobilization  of savings  from the  general  public  has  almost  always  been  contingent  on
MFIs  complying  with existing banking law.  Access  to the capital market,  in turn,  is contingent  on
MFIs complying with securities regulations.3
The Rationale  for Rezulation and  Supervision
2  "Strategy for the Financial Sector", Financial Sector Board, The  World Bank,  Washington, DC, February
2000.
Stefan Staschen,  "Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance Institutions: State of the Knowledge",  GTZ:
Eschborn, August 1999.
416.  A  primary  reason  for  regulating  and  supervising  traditional  financial  institutions  is  consumer
protection  for  public  depositors  in  financial  institutions.  Moral  hazard  issues  arise  because  the
interests  of  financial  institutions  vis-a-vis  the  interests  of consumers  per  se  are  not  necessarily
compatible.  Individual  depositors  and investors may not be in a position to judge the soundness of a
financial  institution  (the  issue  of asymmetric  information),  much less  to  influence  that  institution's
management.  Thus, an impartial  third party which such as the state  or one of its agencies  is required
to regulate  and  control  the  soundness  of a  country's  financial  institutions.  Since bank  failures  and
problems tend to be contagious and  affect other banks regardless of their soundness,  the protection of
the  whole  banking  and  payment  system  becomes  an  additional  objective  of  regulation  and
supervision.
17.  A country's legal framework  and governing principles of financial  intermediation  define the roles of
its banking and financial sector regulatory  authorities  (such as the central bank, ministry of finance, or
bank superintendency),  setting  out rules  for entry  and exit of financial  institutions,  determining  and
limiting  their  businesses  and  products,  and  specifying  criteria  and  standards  for  the  sound  and
sustainable  operation of the industry.  Regulation  (which  usually refers  to non-prudential  regulation
but may include  prudential supervision in its broad general  meaning) is not limited to rules set by the
state alone.  Regulation  may  include  forms of auxiliary  regulation  and self-regulation  by governing
boards  of financial  institutions,  their  networks  and  associations,  or apex  organizations.  Prudential
supervision encompasses  all  measures by  which regulators  enforce compliance  by licensed  financial
institutions with  a given legal  and regulatory  framework,  because  licensing  implies that the financial
authority  is  vouching  for or is prepared  to assume  responsibility  for the soundness  of the regulated
financial institution which the public may be dealing with.
Global Experience in Rezulatinz Microfinance
18.  Banking laws in many countries compartmentalize  and segment markets and institutions, constraining
innovations  and  making  MFIs'  institutional  development  difficult.  While  the  global  experience
demonstrates  the  potential  for  operational  growth  of MFIs,  the  range  of institutional  channels  is
segmented  by  the  legal  and  regulatory  environment.  The  framework  for banking  laws  should  be
structured  to  provide  MFIs  a  clear  view  of the  thresholds  to  attain  on  the  path  to  institutional
development and transformation  -- even if not all MFIs choose to follow that path.
19.  The vast majority of NGO  MFIs  will remain  as retail  delivery  channels  for microfinance  programs
and a few may reach  sustainability without ultimately transforming  into a licensed bank.  Some MFIs
may be better off remaining as  low-leverage,  slow-growth but effective  service institutions  linked to
larger institutions  in  meeting the  needs  of their existing clients.4 Any decision to transform,  evolve,
or  maintain  a  status  quo  is  dependent  on  an  MFI's  strategic  plans  for  its  future.  However,  the
experience  of microfinance  practitioners  in many different  settings throughout  the  developing  world
underscores  the proposition  that the future  for sustainable  microfinance  lies  in a regulated,  licensed
environment - because there  is no other environment that will permit massive, sustainable delivery of
an  increasing  variety of financial  services  to the poor to effectively  link them to the more developed
sectors of an economy.5 Table  1 below  on the operational  characteristics  of sustainable  MFIs,  serves
to illustrate this point further.
4  Cuevas points out that entry into the regulated  financial sector (through institutional transformation) depends
on the nature and extent of existing incentives and deterrents in  the MFI environment and on the  MFI's
perceived potential and actual  ability to reach the market "niche" by becoming regulated.  See Carlos Cuevas,
"Enabling Environment and Microfinance Institutions: Lessons from Latin America ", Journal  of International
Development. 8, March-April 1996.
5  See Christen and Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate.
5Table 1.  Selected  Characteristics of 64 Financially Self-sufficient  MFIs (In %)
Organiz:ational  Operating  self.  Dollar aterage  Etrernalfundsl
formnats  Capital/assets  i  suffic:v  |  loan  Depth*  loans (P
Bank  _  21.0  118.6  527  62.5  166.6
__N n-bak  _  I  _27.4  --- _  110.4_  _958  _L  62.4_  __  70.3
Credit union  42.1  122.5  1,306  91.6  88.6 ____,_____i  ._.__.__f-------------- - ------- '---r---~-----~f~----'
NGO  58.5  !  130.8  490  1  38.8  26.6
*  Depth = Average  loan balance per borrower/GNP per capita.
(P Extemal  funds/loans = Borrowed funds  @ commercial  rates/average  loan portfolio.
Source: The MicroBanking Bulletin, Issue No. 6 (April 2001), Tables C and D.
20.  MFIs  have  large  numbers  of clients  but  low  overall  account  balances  compared  with  traditional
financial institutions.  While MFIs'  share  in total assets  of the  financial  system is relatively  small,
direct  measurements  of MFIs'  relative  position  in  the  overall  financial  system  do  not  take  into
account  the sector's  volume of deposits  in total banking  system deposits,  since MFIs  maintain  their
operating  accounts  and clients'  deposits in the banks.  Their outreach, measured  by the percentage  of
the population doing business with MFIs,  can be quite  large.  As the clients  belong to poor segments
of  the  population  a  bankruptcy  of  either  the  MFI  or  its  depository  bank  would  have  adverse
consequences.  The  argument  that  regulation  and  supervision  in  microfinance  are  less  important
because  of  its  small  place  in  the  financial  system  misjudges  the  exceptional  receptiveness  of this
segment and its possible contribution  to financial systems development.
21.  The existing legal and regulatory frameworks in many of the World Bank's client countries have been
unable  to support  the sustainable  growth and commercial  integration of microfinance  programs  into
the  formal  financial  system.  In  addressing  this problem,  a number of governments  have  begun  to
address  the issue of a transparent and inclusive regulatory framework under which microcredit can be
legitimately  provided by MFIs,  and so that a continuum of MFIs can be developed and strengthened.
These  governments  have  realized  the  advantages  and  benefits  of a "tiered"  banking  and  financial
system  (including  its  regulation  and  supervision),  which  facilitates  the  establishment  of  smaller,
specialized  MFIs.
22.  The countries  which have moved  towards  a tiered financial  and regulatory  structure include  Bolivia
and Peru  in Latin  America;  and Uganda,  Ghana and Zambia  in  Africa.  A number of countries  in
Eastern  Europe  --  e.g.,  Albania,  Bosnia  and  Georgia  - are  restructuring  their  banking  laws  and
prudential regulations to establish a tiered approach to accommodate  specialized financial  institutions
with capitalization  requirements  much lower than  those for regular commercial banks.  In Southeast
Asia,  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia  have  had  tiered  banking  structures,  although  the  existing
regulatory  framework  still does not  make  it possible  for a  range  of MFIs  to be integrated  into  the
regulated financial  sector.  India also has in place basic  statutes that would permit the establishment
of smaller regulated financial institutions with a regional focus.
23.  However,  it  is  important  to  consider  the benefits  versus  the costs  associated  with  establishing  and
implementing  a regulatory  framework  for microfinance.  Regulation and supervision  entail costs, not
only  for the regulator  but also for the regulated  institution.  For instance,  BancoSol's  management
estimates  that complying  with the bank superintendency's  reporting requirements  during its first year
of operations generated  a cost equivalent to 5%  of the loan portfolio, even though this had declined to
about  1%  of loan  portfolio  as of last  year.6 In  Peru, supervision  fees  collected  by the credit union
6  Cited in Christen and Rosenberg, The Rush to Regulate.
6federation  FENACREP  are  enough  to inspect  only 40  of its  130  member credit unions  each  year.7
Thus,  the price  of regulation  has  to  be carefully  adjusted  to the  benefits it is expected  to produce.
Over-regulation  may result in financial  repression, limiting the efficiency  of financial intermediation
and increasing  costs for consumers.  The  growing research  and literature  on microfinance  regulation
highlight  the  importance  of a clear  regulatory  framework  to support  sustainable  microfinance,  and
call attention to some  important  considerations  especially of timing and  phasing.  First, not all MFIs
need to be regulated  and supervised,  as can be seen in the tiered structure  for MFIs and for regulation,
based  on  their  intermediation  activities.  Second,  there  needs  to  be  a  critical  mass  of institutions
suitable  for prudential  regulation/supervision,  to justify the  commitment  of public  resources  to the
undertaking.  Third, the approach to regulation differs from country to country,  and there  is no single
universal regulatory  model that should be adopted because of different  macroeconomic  environments
and stages of microfinance  development.
Financial  Intermediation Activities  as the Basis for Regulation
24.  Differences  in the  organizational  and  operating  characteristics  of the  various  types  of MFIs  leave
them vulnerable  to  certain  risks.  The risk-based  approach  to financial  regulation  shows  that while
there  may  be  no  major  variances  in  the  structure  of their  assets,  MFIs  are  differentiated  by  the
structure  of  their  liabilities  --  i.e.,  how their  assets and  operations  are funded  and  the  adequacy  of
capital in leveraging  additional resources  to fund operations.  Linking the  wholesale  funding,  limited
deposit-taking  and  unrestricted  deposit-taking  activities  to  an  institution's  qualifying  capital  base
results  in limits to  the asset build-up  that  MFIs  can prudently  undertake,  without having  to instruct
them on  how to carry  out their businesses.  The authorization  to mobilize  funds  from the public in
turn carries related requirements  to comply with prudential  standards and guidelines  on certain asset-
side  activities,  e.g.,  lirnits  on  concentration  in  loan  exposure  to  sectors,  restrictions  on  insider  and
related-party loans, provisions for possible loan losses, etc.
25.  Regulation based on typology of financial  institutions rather  than on intermediation  activities  creates
incentives for regulatory arbitrage. Organizers  of financial institutions  seek out licensing categories
which requiring  the least  initial capital  commitment and the lowest degree  of mandatory regulation.
All participants  in the financial system including microfinance  stakeholders  benefit from a transparent
regulatory  framework  which  establishes  the continuum  where  MFIs  can progressively  evolve into
formal  financial  institutions.  The  regulatory  framework  model  identifies  thresholds of  financial
intermediation  activities  which  would  trigger a  requirement  to  satisfy  external or  mandatory
regulatory  guidelines.8 As financial  institutions,  it  would be prudent for all  of the different  types of
MFIs to observe internal or voluntary guidelines for risk management.  Table 2 below accents the key
features  of the regulatory framework  model -- identifying the  fund generating  activities  that trigger a
need  for  mandatory  external  guidelines  and  summarizing  the  proposed  regulatory  measures  and
agencies to carry them out.
7  See  Glenn D.  Westley,  Can Financial Market Policies Reduce Income Inequality? Technical Papers Series,
MSM-112.  Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank,  October  2001.
8  See H.  van Greuning, J.  Gallardo and B. Randhawa, A  Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper  No. 2061, February 1999, Washington, DC.
7Table 2:  Regulatory Thresholds for Activities of Microfinance Institutions 9
7Type of  institution  Ownership  Main sources  offundsfor  Actvites  that trigger  Form of external regalation  Regalatory authority
_____________________  _______________  operations and loans  regulal ion  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Informal Comnmunity-based Thrift  Community and village  - Fees and assessments on  None  None  None
& Credit Self-Help Group - residents  members
funding from community  - Members'  savings
members  and loans from NGOs  depsed wit  g
and MFIs  deposited with SHG
Category  A:  Other People's  Local and foreign  Grants and donated funds  None - provided micro-  Registration as Non-Profit  Registrar of Societies
Money (NGO)  - Funding from  donors through a Trust  finance loans do not exceed  Society or Trust  and/or Trusts
donor funds  donated funds
Category A:  Other People's  Grants and donations  - Grants and donated funds  - Generating liabilities  - Registration  as limited  - Registrar of companies
Money (Microfinance  NGO) - converted to share  - Concessional and  from commercial  liability company  - Central bank authority
Added funding via commercial  capital  commercial  borrowings  - Concessional  sources to  - Rating by Credit Rating  or superintendency
loans/securities issues  (wholesale  deposit  fund operations and loans  Agency
instruments)  - Licensing by bank  - Securities regulatory
authority as non-bank  agency
finance company
Category B:  Members'  Money - Members joined by  Share capital contributed and  Accepting deposits from  Registration  as a financial  - Registrar of
funding from members'  recognized closed  savings deposited by members  members, and making loans  cooperative  Cooperatives, or of
contributions  common bond  to members  [Large institutions may fall  Societies
under jurisdiction of  or




Category C:  The Public's Money  Individual and  - Contributed  share capital  - Accepting wholesale  - Registration as limited-  - Registrar of companies
- funding from retail public  institutional  investors,  - Commercial  borrowings  - Retail public deposits for  liability company  - Central bank authority,
deposits  and shareholders  intermediation into loans  - Licensing by banking  or superintendency
- Wholesale deposits  and investments  authority as NBFI, or
- Retail public deposits  service bank
9  Source: Adapted from Chart I and Table 2, H.  van Greuning, J.  Gallardo,  and B. Randhawa, A Framework  for Regulating Microfinance  Institutions World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper  No.  2061,  Washington, DC, February  1999.
8V  BACKGROUND  ON MICROFINANCE  IN GHANA
Macroeconomic and  Policy Environment
26.  Ghana has  a population  of about  18 million,  which has been growing  at about 3%  per year.  Recent
statistics (1999-2000)  indicate  that 63% of the population  live in rural areas and 37%  in urban  areas.
Gross  domestic  product  (GDP)  stood  at  US$7.558  billion,  with  an  annual  growth  rate of 4.5%.
However,  inflation has continued to be a problem: the end-of-period  inflation rate was  13.8%  in  1999,
and estimated  at 23.0% in  2000.  Ghana's per capita GNP of US$390 is much lower than the average
per capita  income  level  of US$520  for  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  Ghana's  financial  structure  is  fairly
shallow:  the  degree  of monetization  of the economy,  as measured  by the  M2/GDP ratio,  stands at
19%.  Because  the  level  of  international  reserves  stands  at  only  1.5  months  of imports,  Ghana's
economy is markedly vulnerable to external shocks.
27.  Ghana  has focused  on  poverty  reduction  as  the  core  of its  development  strategy.  This  approach
galvanized  in  1995  when  the  first version  of  Ghana - Vision 2020 was  launched  and  institutional
arrangements  began to be put in place to promote  and analyze  poverty reduction.  The  Government
had  prepared  (as  of July  2000)  a  Development Strategy for Poverty Reduction, an  Interim Poverty
Reduction  Strategy Paper (Interim PRSP) to take up with the World bank and the IMF.
28.  The overall policy framework for microfinance  is informed by the poverty reduction  strategy,  which
seeks to balance growth and macroeconomic  stability with human development  and empowerment in
such a way as to positively  impact  the reduction of the country's  poverty levels in the medium term.
The  strategy  identifies  the  main  sources  of poverty,  and  aims  to  explicitly  measure  all  sectoral
strategies  and programs  in  terms  of the  extent  to  which they  contribute  to reducing  poverty.  The
overall  strategy emphasizes  the reduction of inflation and the need to sharply reduce  the fiscal deficit,
as  a key  step to reduce  the extent  of the public  sector's  crowding  out of the private  sector  in  the
financial markets,  and to help lower interest rates.
Poverty in the Ghanaian  Context
29.  From a level of 51%  of the population in  1991-1992, poverty  in Ghana has decreased  to about 43% of
the population  living  below  Ghana  ¢900,000  in  1998.  Still, the  average  consumption  level  of the
poor in Ghana  is about  30%  below  the  upper poverty  line of Ghana ¢900,000.  The reductions  in
poverty  levels  have tended  to be  concentrated  in the  Accra  area  and in  the Rural  Forest localities.
Poverty  is higher  in  rural  areas  (51.6 %)  than  in urban  areas  (22.8%):  more than  one-half  of the
population  living in the Rural  Savannah  regions  continue to be extremely  poor.  Poverty  is highest
among  the  self-employed  households  cultivating  agricultural  crops  and has  decreased  only  slightly,
compared  to  the  self-employed  households  engaged  in  export-crop  agriculture  and  the  wage
employees in the public and private  sectors.
Structure of the Microfinance  Sector
30.  Ghana  has  a  tiered range  of formal,  semi-formal  and  informal  institutions providing  microfinance
services  to  the  urban  and  rural  poor  and  underserved  sectors  of  the  economy.  Financial
intermediation  and credit activities  are under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Bank of Ghana (BOG).
The regulatory  framework  under  the Banking  Law  (1989)  and the Non-Bank  Financial  Institutions
(NBFI)  Law  (1993)  accommodate  a  tiered  structure  of  licensed  financial  intermediaries  and  of
financial  regulation.  A  snapshot  summary  of the  range  of  institutions  providing  microfinance
services  (mostly  microcredit  and savings  facilities)  and  the  legal and regulatory  environment  under
which they  operate  is shown in Table 3 below.
931.  The formal  sector institutions  providing  microfinance  services consist  of Rural  Banks,  Savings  and
Loan  (S&L)  companies  and  Credit  Unions.  Rural  Banks  are  public  companies  owned  by
communities (with capitalization assistance  from the BOG), registered and licensed as unit banks (no
branching  privileges)  under the  provisions of the Banking Law.  The operations  of Rural Banks are
limited  to  a  clearly-defined  geographical  (rural)  area,  and  are permitted  to offer banking  services
limited  to loans  and  to checking,  savings  and  time deposits.  Moreover,  the  ownership  and voting
control  structures  of  Rural  Banks  resemble  credit  unions  because  of  their  one  share-one  vote
structure.
32.  In  contrast,  private  individual  parties  own  the S&L  Companies,  which  are  registered  and  licensed
under the  NBFI Law and are permitted  to offer banking  services limited to loans and to savings  and
time deposits.  Unlike the Rural Banks,  ownership  and control structures  of S&L companies  (which,
like  commercial  banks,  have  branching  privileges)  follow  cumulative  shareholding  positions.  The
minimum capitalization  requirements at entry for both Rural Banks (US$20,000) and S&L companies
(US$50,000)  are significantly lower than the levels set for commercial and development banks.
33.  The  Credit  Unions  which  are  mutually-owned  cooperative  associations  of individual  members  are
registered under the Law on Cooperatives  and subject to regulation by the Credit Union Supervisory
Board,  a  government  agency.  They  are  also required,  under  the NBFI  Law,  to be registered  and
licensed  by the BOG.
34.  A number of NGOs, organized  by private parties  as trust entities  or charitable  institutions  under the
provisions of the Law on Trusts and Charitable Institutions, provide both microloans  and nonfinancial
services  to  their  client-base,  without  being  subject  to  regulation  or  supervision  by  external
government  agencies.  The  majority  of microcredit  NGOs  belong  to  an  umbrella  organization  -
Ghana  Micro  Finance  Network  (GHAMF1N)  - which  provides  staff  training  and  organizational
capacity-building  assistance  and disseminates  best practice  guidelines and standards for governance,
operations and performance efficiency.
35.  There  is  a  large  number  of  susu collectors in  the  informal  sector,  who  provide  collection  and
safekeeping  services  for  the  savings  of  mostly  women  market-vendors  and  operators  of
microenterprises.  Technically,  susu  collectors are  not  involved  in  intermediating  the  aggregate
savings  which  they  collect  and  manage  into  loans.  However,  the  women  market  vendors  and
microenterprise  operators  have been able to access "loans" from their own susu collectors in the form
of "advance  draw-downs"  against the total amount of savings they have contracted to deposit weekly
for  a  set  period.  In  most  cases,  these  advances  have  been  made  possible  by  commercial  and
development  banks,  rural  banks,  and  S&L  companies  with  which  the  susu collectors deposit  the
savings funds they collect and manage.  There were indications that the "advance draw-down"  feature
had been introduced as a response to increasing  competition among susu collectors for the savings of
the market vendors  and microenterprise operators.
36.  A variation on the susu collection system  is the susu club, wherein the members - the women market
vendors  and microenterprise  operators  go to  a designated  place on a scheduled  day of the week to
make their savings deposits with the susu collector who runs the susu club.  The set-up allows a susu
collector  to service the savings deposit safekeeping  needs of a much larger number of clients.
10TABLE 3: GHANA - MICROFINANCE  INSTITUTIONS  AND REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK
Type of MFI  Ownership  Legal Basis  Organized  as  Fund Source  Authorized Activ'ities  Aurisdctio  Agevinc  Target  Market
Comm'i  Banks  Private /  State  Companies Act;  Limited Liability  Equity capital,  Full-service  bank  Bank of Ghana  Bank of Ghana  Individuals,
in Microtinance  Banking Law  Company  comm'I  loans,  Comm'l
deposits  enterprises
Agriculture Development  State-owned  Companies Act;  Limited Liability  Equity capital,  Full-service bank  Bank of Ghana  Bank of Ghana;  Individuals,
Bank  Banking Law  Company  comm'l loans,  RFID  Comm'l
deposits  enterprises
ARB Apex Bank  Rural  Banks;  Companies Act;  Limited Liability  Gov't &  Int'l grants  Apex bank functions  Bank of Ghana  Bank of Ghana;  Rural Banks
Bank of Ghana  Banking Law  Company  &  loans  under NBFI  License  RFID
Rural Banks  Community  Companies Act;  Limited Liability  Gov't loans,  Savings deposits and  Bank of Ghana  Bank of Ghana;  Individuals &
owned; [BOG has  Banking Law  Company;  Unit  deposits  micro-loans  RFID  businesses in
preferred  shares]  Bank  service area
Ghamfin  Individuals  and  Law on Trusts  Company  limited  Grants &  donations  Umbrella body of  None  None  NGOs,  MFIs,
organizations  and Charitable  by Guarantee (Not-  informal and formal  S&Ls, Cus, Govt
Institutions  for-profit)  MFIs; Training  Agencies
resources
Savings &  Loan  Private parties  Companies Act;  Limited Liability  Equity capital;  Savings deposits and  NBFI /  BOG  NBFI  I BOG  Individuals; small
Compnaies  NBFI  Law  Company  grants; loans,  micro-loans; hire-  business, Susu
deposits  purchase financing  collectors
Ghana Credit Union  Primary-level  Law on Cooperatives  Cooperative  Member  Unions'  Wholesale loans /  Registrar;  Registrar;  Credit Unions
Association  credit unions  (Credit  Unions); NBFI  Society  capital  deposits; CFF;  CU  NBFI/BOG  NBFI/BOG
Law  contributions;  PEARLS, training,
loans; grants;  monitoring,
deposits  assessment
Credit  Unions  Individuals and  Law on Cooperatives  Cooperative  Members'  share  Members only savings  Registrar;  CU  Ghana CUA;  Individual
organizations  (Credit  Unions);  NBFI  Society  capital &  deposits  deposits and micro-  Supervision  NBFI/BOG  members
Law  loans  Board; CUA;
NBFI/BOG
NGOs  Private parties  Law on Trusts  Company limited  Grants &  donations  Micro-loans;  Ghamfin  None  Individuals;
and Charitable  by Guarantee  (Not-  Nonfinancial services  Groups
Institutions  for-profit)
National Assn. of Susu  Individual Susu  Law on  Cooperatives  Cooperative  Members' share  Taking deposits;  None  None  Susu Collectors
Collectors  Colectors  Society  capital  making loans to
contributions  member susu
collectors
Individual Susu  Individual Susu  None  None  Clients' fees  Collecting &  safe-  None  None  Market vendors;
Collectors  Colectors  keeping of clients'  Self-employed
savings
-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~137.  Individual  susu collectors and  susu clubs  are  neither  registered  nor  licensed  by any  government
agency,  although  there  is a  rapidly  growing  number  of  individual  susu  collectors who belong  to
cooperative associations of collectors (e.g.,  the National Association of Susu Collectors  or the Greater
Accra  Association  of  Susu  Collectors),  which  have  taken  steps  to  establish  accreditation  and
identification  procedures  for their members as  well as a form of deposit protection  for the clients of
their collector-members  who would surely  suffer losses  in the event of nonperformance  due to death
or defalcation by a susu collector.  Susu collectors would have an average of 150-200 women market
vendors  and  microenterprise  operators  as  clients,  while  susu clubs may  have  as  many  as  400-500
women market vendors and microenterprise operators as clients.
38.  Traders,  input-suppliers,  money-lenders,  rotating  savings  and  credit  associations  (ROSCAs),  and
accumulating  savings and credit associations (ASCAs)  constitute the informal segment of the  market
for microfinance  in Ghana.
Legal and Regulatory  Framework for Microfinance
39.  Highlights  of the Legal  Structure and Judicial System.  Except  for  susu collectors, susu clubs,
ROSCAs and ASCAs, MFIs in Ghana are required to establish legal entity.  Banks and NBFIs (which
include rural banks and S&L companies) are required to be incorporated  entities under the Companies
Act.  Credit unions have legal status and identity through registration under the Cooperative  Societies
Act  as  well  as  the  requirements  of  the  NBFI  Law.  NGOs,  including  those  with  rnicrocredit
orientation,  have  legal  status  through  establishment  under the provisions  of the Law  on Trusts  and
Charitable  Institutions  and  the  required  registration  with  the Ministry  of Employment  and  Social
Welfare.
40.  Ghana's  legal  structure  and judicial  system  needs  to  be  further  modernized  and  upgraded  (i)  to
facilitate  creation/registration/execution  of  lender's  security  interests  on  pledged  collateral,  (ii)
eliminate  duplicate/multiple  pledging  of  collateral,  and  (iii)  facilitate  introduction  of  securitized
financial  instruments  that  can  benefit  microfinance  development  through  better  connection  and
linkages to formal sector institutions and financial markets.  These modernizing improvements  will be
beneficial  not just to the development of sustainable microfmance,  but for the formal financial  sector
as well.  As the experience  of other countries  (e.g.,  Romania) has demonstrated,  reforming the legal
and regulatory  frameworks  for  financial  transactions  secured  with  movable assets  has  a  substantial
favorable  impact  on  expanding  access  to markets  for rural  credit  and microfinance.10 For  Ghana,
such reforms  would need to be accompanied  by a significant reduction in government  programs that
can crowd out sustainable microfinance  by private sector institutions.
41.  Highlights of the Regulatory Framework.  In Ghana, a tiered structure of institutions and graduated
regulation  for  rnicrofinance  existed  even  before  the  Government  gave  formal  recognition  to
microfinance  in  1999  and through new BOG regulations  pertaining  specifically  to  microfinance.  11
The  newly-adopted  formal  policies  on  rnicrofinance  and  the  adoption  of a  regulatory  framework
specific  to microfinance  activities had parallel  co-existence  with an  existing credit-quota  system for
agricultural credit and SME finance.  The regulatory  (and tax) preferences enjoyed by rural  banks and
credit unions  in combination with the operation  of a graduated/tiered  system have made it possible for
NGO  MFIs  to  transform  into  licensed  institutions.  This  has  been  an  indispensable  element  for
0  See World Bank,  "An Alternative Approach to Improving Rural Financial  Markets in Romania", Rural Finance
Briefing Note No. 1, January  2000.
The Non-Bank Financial  Institutions  Business (BOG) Rules issued by the Bank of Ghana clearly defines micro-
finance as  "...  lending to borrowers with the capacity to support loans of less than one million cedis, and in
case of group lending - with joint and several guarantees of members of the group - for an amount not
exceeding five million cedis."
12substantially  expanding  the ability of MFIs to mobilize  financial resources beyond  traditional  grants
and donations.
42. However,  the  remaining  traditions  of  the  former  credit  quota  system  can  be  detrimental  to
microfinance,  and further policy clarification  on this aspect is indispensable.  The BOG continues  to
coordinate  closely  with GHAMFIN  and with the Ghana  Credit Union Association  (CUA)  to develop
regulatory  standards that can  help promote institutional  growth of the  microfinance  industry, and is
seriously  considering  ways to simplify  prudential  standards/guidelines.  A further  development  that
bears  watching  is  the  establishment  of a  Government-sponsored  and  supported apex  institution  for
rural banks.  The experience elsewhere has shown that government-promoted  apex organizations  pose
a  significant  risk  of distorting  the  allocation  of  scarce  financial  resources  and  competing  unfairly
against private MFIs  because of access to subsidized resources,  thereby retarding the development  of
truly sustainable  microfinance.
43.  The Rural Banks, S&L companies, Credit Unions which are registered with and licensed by the BOG
are not directly included in the central clearing and payments system.  They participate  in the central
systems  for clearing  and  payments  through  the  larger  commercial  banks.  BOG  cancelled  check-
clearing services for all rural  banks in 1992, which has made it extremely difficult for even  the better
rural banks to effectively  compete in the marketplace, retain  their clientele,  and lower their operating
costs.  Neither do Rural Banks have access  to BOG's discount  window and  all of them are subject to
identical loan-to-deposit ratio requirements.
44.  Credit unions are currently regulated  under a self-regulatory mode, in the interim that a separate set of
prudential norms and guidelines  specific  to credit unions  is being put together by the NBFI!BOG.  In
addition,  credit unions approved  for licensing  by BOG have to comply with and meet the prudential
standards  set  by the CUA,  whose  vetting  is pre-requisite  to BOG  licensing.  The  prudential  norms
followed  by  the  CUA,  which  is  supported  by the  Canadian  Cooperative  Association  (CCA),  are
sirnilar  to  operating  and  financial  standards  promoted  by  the  World  Council  of  Credit  Union
(WOCCU).
45.  Prudential standards.  The risk management criteria considered  by BOG as important for MFIs and
the adjustments  made to recognize  characteristics  of microfinance  operations  are discussed below.
*  Capital  adequacy.  The  minimum  capitalization  requirements  for  licensed  MFIs  - S&L
companies  and Rural Banks - are  significantly lower than those for commercial  banks  and long-
term development  banks.  S&L companies  are required  to have  a paid-up  capital of US$50,000
while  Rural  Banks  are  required  to  have  US$20,000  in paid-up  capital.  The  solvency  standard
established by BOG for these licensed  financial institutions  is unimpaired  capital equivalent  to at
least 6%  of risk assets  for Rural Banks,  and  10%  of risk assets for S&L companies.  There are
indications  that a significant number of Rural Banks,  and S&L companies  have capital  adequacy
deficiencies  - largely  because  of unfavorable  operating  guidelines  (e.g.,  on  secondary  reserves)
that  had  to  be  adhered  to,  rapid  growth  in  loan  portfolios  even  as  this  growth  was  being
accompanied  by increases  in non-performing  loans and inadequate provisioning.  Nonetheless,  it
seems  clear  that  capital  adequacy  levels  need  to  be  reviewed  periodically  for  appropriate
adjustments.
*  Mandatory  liquidity reserves.  BOG  prescribes  the primary  and secondary  reserve  assets  that
licensed deposit-taking  institutions  are required  to hold,  relative  to an institution's  total  deposit
liabilities.  Currently,  BOG requires  all Rural  Banks to maintain  a prohibitively  high  secondary
reserve  of  52%  of  deposit  liabilities'2 (but  S&L  companies  are  required  to  maintain  a
12  For rural  banks, the mandatory ratio of primary reserves (cash plus balances with other banks) to total deposit
liabilities is 10%,  although the actual ratio of primary reserves maintained by rural banks has been much
higher -- 27% in 1998 (Source:  Bank of Ghana  Annual Report, 1998).
13comparatively  lower  secondary  reserve of  15%  of deposit liabilities)  to be held in  government
debt instruments,  Treasury Bills.  While the high secondary reserve requirement might have been
intended  to  strengthen  these  smaller  financial  institutions,  the  regulations  do  not  distinguish
between  stronger  vis-a-vis  weaker  MFIs  and thereby  penalizes  the  more efficient  and  stronger
institutions.  BOG  classifies  Rural  Banks  into  a  number  of  categories  - e.g.,  satisfactory,
mediocre  and distressed - which could easily form a basis for a more fair and effective  system of
rewards  and  penalties  for  acceptable  financial  performance.  The  high  level  of  mandatory
secondary reserves significantly increases the funding costs for microfinance  loans.
Security for loans.  Current prudential guidelines require licensed banks to obtain physical  assets
to  secure  loans.  While  formal  sector  banks  and  financial  institutions  have  begun  to  accept
treasury bills and  deposit balances  as acceptable  collateral,  these options  are clearly beyond  the
reach of poor households  in the rural and urban areas.  Close coordination  between  the Ministry
of Finance,  BOG  and  GHAMFIN  have  led to  a better  understanding  of the characteristics  of
microfinance  loans  and,  possibly,  formalizing  the  status  of group  guarantees  as  acceptable
collateral in microfinance  loans.
Recognition  and  classification  of  delinquent  loans.  All  licensed  financial  institutions  are
required to monitor and review their portfolio of credit and risk assets at least once every quarter
on a regular basis.  Assets  are classified  into four grades  of risk:  (i) standard;  (ii)  sub-standard;
(iii) doubtful;  and (iv)  loss.  Assets  in risk grades  (ii) to (iv) are considered non-performing  and
therefore  no  income  may  be  accrued  on  them.  BOG  has  specified  prudential  norms  for
microenterprise  and  small  business  finance  which  take  into  account  the characteristics  of the
enterprises  and  businesses  in  these  two  categories.  Microfinance  and small  business  loans  are
required  to be reviewed  once  monthly and are to be classified into (i) current, or (ii) delinquent.
A delinquent loan is one  on which payment  of interest or scheduled payment of principal has not
been received  as of due date.  BOG does not permit  interest income to be accrued  on delinquent
loans accounts.
Provisioning for portfolio at risk.  Provisioning  for delinquent  microfinance  and small business
loans  is  made  on  a  "basket"  basis,  rather  than  on  an  individual  loan  basis.  Basket-based
provisioning involves  making a blanket provision for the aggregate  outstanding balances of loans
grouped  in each arrearage  basket,  without regard  to  any security  available  for individual  loans.
The prescribed  rate of provisioning for microfinance  and small business loans is shown below:
In  addition  to  the  specific  loss  Number of days delinquent  Rate of provisioning
provisions to be made for delinquent or
non-performing  microfinance  and  U
small  business  loans,  BOG  requires  30days andlessthandays_  20
licensed  MFIs  to  maintain  a  general  _6ays  less than 90  days  40
loss  provision  of  1%  of the  aggregate  9920aand less than 120 days  60
outstanding  of  all  the  current  or  120 days and less than  150 days  |  80
standard class of loan assets.  Financial  150 days and above  100
institutions  are  also  required  to
separately  disclose,  in  their  financial  accounts  and  reports,  the  specific  and  general  loss
provisions made for non-performing delinquent loans and standard/current  loan assets.
Guidelines  and  standards for  writing-off  of  non-performing  loans.  The  general  practice
among licensed MFIs is to write off non-performing  or delinquent loans at the time that the loan
loss is confirmed.  It does  not appear that BOG has specified a procedure covering the mandatory
writing off of non-performing loans.  A standard procedure and timing that triggers off mandatory
write-off would  obviously be imnpacted  by the ability (or lack thereof)  of MFIs to comply  with
capital adequacy and loan loss reserve requirements.
14VI  ASSESSMENT  OF GHANA'S  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE
46.  Ghana accords  high-level recognition  of the importance and relevance  of microfinance  - through the
establishment  of the  Office  of Microfinance  Policy  Coordination  in  the  Ministry  of Finance.  The
regulatory framework  is so structured as to provide room for NGO MFIs to establish viable links with
formal  financial  sector  and  to  become  properly  licensed  financial  institutions  at  several  entry  and
progression  levels  (S&L companies,  and Rural  Banks).  A primary  question  to address is,  what  are
appropriate levels of institutional  capitalization for licensed  MFIs.
47.  Reforms  in the legal system and judicial  processes  need to be  made in order to catch up and keep in
step with  growth of the  microfinance  industry.  There  are significant  obstacles  and problems  related
to recognizing  and protecting  security  interest  in pledged  collateral,  and access  for MFIs  to capital
markets  through financial securities (capital market instruments).
48.  Serious  attention needs to be given to the technical  capacity of BOG (and other government  agencies)
for  adequate  supervision  of licensed MFIs  (monitoring and technical  guidance).  Moreover,  there  is
an  urgent  need  to squarely  address  and clarify the ambivalent  policy and  regulatory  framework  on
Rural  Banks.  The  ownership  structure  of  Rural  Banks  resembles  that  of cooperative  financial
institutions;  the  level of owners'  commitment to support  the financial  institution  is  severely  limited
given  the  insignificant  value  required  for  each  share  held  (Ghana  ¢50),  and  therefore  there  are
resulting  serious  problems  in  internal  governance.  Ghana's  makers  of financial  policy  need  to
address  the  following  issues:  (i)  is  privatization  with  greater  monetary  commitments  from  fewer
shareholders  the answer?  (ii) how should insolvent, capital-deficient  or unsound Rural Banks be dealt
with,  particularly their depositors?  (iii) what should be the proper role  of the new apex institution  for
Rural Banks?
49.  A  major  achievement  of the  stakeholders  in  Ghana's  microfinance  community  is  the  degree  of
coordination  between BOGINBFI vis-a-vis CUA in vetting (through a certificate  of good standing) of
credit unions  seeking to comply with registration  and licensing requirements and in disseminating  and
enforcing  standards and guidelines for effective governance  and voluntary (internal regulation).
50.  Overall,  Ghana's  financial  institutions  continue  to service  a  narrow  range  of clients  and few  have
direct  linkages  with  each  other  - leaving  large  portions  of  the  bankable  public,  particularly
microenterprises  and  small  businesses,  with  limited  or no  access  to  convenient  credit  and  secure
savings options.  For instance,  Ghana Commercial  Bank,  with 96 of its  134  branches  in rural  areas,
has  nothing  other  than  a  check-clearing  relationship  with  neighboring  rural  banks.  Without  the
needed  linkages,  sustainable  rural finance  operations  will continue  to be  constrained  by inadequate
client information, low business volumes,  poor governance, and  inadequate supervision.
VII  BACKGROUND  ON MICROFINANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
Macroeconomic  and Policy Environment
51.  The Philippines  has  a population  of about 73.4 million,  which has been  growing  at about 2.3% per
year,  compared  to  population  growth  of  1.2%  annually  for  countries  in  the East  Asia  and  Pacific
region.  Recent statistics (1999-2000)  indicate that 44% of the population live in rural areas  and 56%
in urban  areas.  Gross Domestic  Product  (GDP)  stood at US$82.2  billion (with GNP of US$1,200),
with  an  annual  growth  rate  of 4.5%.  Inflation  has  not been  a  problem in  recent  years  as  annual
change in the CPI has  averaged  5.0%,  while the level of interest  rates has remained  stable at a level
between  6.5%  and  8%  p.a.  Agriculture  now  accounts  for  only  17.5%  of GDP,  while  Industry
accounts for 31%  and the Services  sector 52%.  The financial  structure  has  modest depth:  the degree
of monetization  of  the  economy  (as  measured  by  the  M2/GDP  ratio)  stands  at 47.5%,  with  the
15population-to-bank  office  ratio  standing  at  10,200  persons  per  bank  office.  In  spite  of  this
macroeconomic  setting,  the  Philippines  has  had  a  focus  on  poverty  reduction  as  the  core  of  its
development strategy for some time.
52.  The overall policy framework  for microfinance  is informed  by the overall framework and strategy for
poverty  alleviation,  safety  nets  and  rural  development,  which  seek  to  balance  growth  and
macroeconomic  stability  with human  development  and empowerment  in such  a way as  to positively
impact the reduction of the  country's  poverty levels  in the medium term.  The  strategic  framework
identifies  the  main  sources  of poverty,  and  aims  to  explicitly  measure  all  sectoral  strategies  and
programs in terms of the extent to which they contribute  to reducing poverty.
Poverty in the Philippine  Context
53.  Some  37.5%  of the population,  or 27.3 million people live below the poverty line.  Within this circle
of poverty  that afflicts 32.1%  of all families  with poverty,  18.5%  of all urban families are poor, and
44.4%  of rural families  live in poverty.  Poverty trends  have been declining  during  the past decade,
but poverty has been persistent  in certain  urban areas (primarily  the National Capital Region,  which
continues  to  be  a  magnet  for  migration  from  the  poorer  provincial  areas)  and  a  number  of rural
regions -- especially the Bicol provinces and most of the  Mindanao region.
Structure of the Microfinance  Sector
54.  Compared  to  Ghana,  the Philippines  has  a  comparatively  wider  range  of formal,  semi-formal  and
informal  institutions  providing  rnicrofinance  services  to the  urban and  rural poor  and  underserved
sectors  of  the  economy.  Financial  intermediation  and  credit  activities  are  under  the  regulatory
jurisdiction  of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas  (BSP).  The regulatory framework  under  the General
Banking  Law of 2000  (which  repealed  the General  Banking  Act of 1949)  and a number of parallel
Laws  governing  specialized  banks  and  NBFI  have  made  room  for  a  tiered  structure  of licensed
financial  intermediaries  and  of financial  regulation.  The  General  Banking  Law  of 2000 provides
adequate  room for banks  and  quasi-banks  to  have  foreign equity  content:  foreign  individuals  and
non-bank  corporations  are  permitted  to own  or  control  up  to 40% of the voting  stock of a  licensed
bank or quasi-bank.  The percentage  of foreign-owned  voting stock  is determined by the citizenship
of  individual  shareholders,  and  the  citizenship  of  a  corporation  follows  the  citizenship  of  its
controlling  shareholders, regardless  of its place of incorporation.  A snapshot  summary of the range of
institutions  providing  microfinance  services  (mostly  microcredit  and  savings facilities)  is  shown  in
Table 4 below.
55. The  formal  sector  institutions  directly  and  indirectly  providing  microfinance  services  consist  of
Commercial  Banks, Thrift Banks (Savings  and Mortgage  Banks, Private  Development Banks, Stock
Savings  and  Loan  Associations),  Non-Stock  Savings  and  Loan  Associations,  Rural  Banks,
Cooperative  Banks,  Finance  Companies,  Private Lending  Investors  and Pawnshops.  Credit  Unions
and  Savings  and  Credit  Cooperatives  (including  savings  and  credit  units  of  multipurpose
cooperatives)  are included in the  formal sector, even though these types of institutions are outside the
coverage  of the  General  Banking  Law  and the jurisdiction  of the BSP.  Commercial  Banks, Thrift
Banks,  Non-Stock  Savings  and  Loan  Associations,  Rural  Banks,  Finance  Companies,  Private
Lending  Investors and Pawnshops  are owned by private individual investors,  and  are registered  and
licensed  by the  BSP  under the provisions  of the  General  Banking  Law or other institution-specific
laws.
16Table 4: PHILIPPINES  - MICROFINANCE  INSTITUTIONS AND REGUJLATORY  FRAMEWORK
Type  of MFI  Ownership  Legal Basis  Organized  as  Fund  Source  Authorized  Agency  Agency  Target  Market Activities  Jurisdiction  __upervisioon  TagtMre
Private  or  Gen.  Banking  Limited  Liability  Equity Capital,  Full-service bank;  Central Bank;  Central Bank;  Bank/Non-Bank Comm'l  Banks  Gov't.  Law; Law on  Company  Comm'l  Funds,  Deposit  Deposit Insurance  MFIs (RBs,  CBs,
in Microfinance  shareholders  Corporations  Deposits  Insurance  Co.  Co.  NBFCs)
People's  Credit &  Land  Bank  Finance Co. Act  Limited  Liability  Capital / loan funds  Apex  Central Bank;  None  Coop Banks, NGO
Finance  Corp.  Philippines  Company  from Gov't & Int'l  Organization  Land Bank  MFIs
Agencies
Thrift Banks  Private  Thrift Banks  Limited  Liability  Equity capital,  Savings deposits  Central  Bank;  Central Bank;  Microenterprises/
Investors  Act; Law on  Company  comm'l funds,  and  loans  Deposit  Deposit  Insurance  small business;
Corporations  deposits  Insurance  Co.  Co.  general public
Rural  Banks  Private  Rural Banks  Limited  Liability  Equity capital,  Savings deposits  Central  Bank;  Central Bank;  Microenterprises/
Investors  Act;  Law on  Company  comm'l funds,  and  loans  Deposit  Deposit Insurance  small  business;
Corporations  deposits  Insurance Co.  Co.  general  public
Cooperative  Banks  Cooperative  Rural Banks  Limited Liability  Equity capital,  Savings deposits  Central  Bank;  Central Bank;  Microenterprises/
Societies  Act;  Cooperat-  Company  comm'l funds,  and micro-loans  Deposit  Deposit  Insurance  small business!
ives Code  deposits  Insurance Co.  Co.  cooperatives
NonBank  Finance  Private  Gen.  Banking  Limited  Liability  Equity capital,  Wholesale  Central  Bank  Central Bank  Microenterprises/
Company  Investors  Law;  Law on  Company  comm'l funds  deposits and  small business
Corporations  microloans
Pawnshops  Private  Gen.  Banking  Ltd Liab  Co; Sole  Equity capital,  Pawn loans  Central  Bank;  None  Individuals
Investors  Law  Prop,  Partnership  comm'l funds  SEC
2nd/3rd -Tier  Primary-level  Cooperatives  Cooperative  Members'  equity  Mgmnt/finance  Cooperatives  None  Savings & Credit
Federation  of Credit  cooperative  Code  Association  capital, comm'l  services +  Development  Cooperatives;
Unions or Savings &  societies  funds, deposits  liquidity facility to  Authority  Credit Unions
Credit Cooperatives  member coops
Credit Unions and  Individual  Cooperatives  Cooperative  Capital + deposits  Savings deposits  Cooperatives  None  Individual members
Savings &  Credit  members  Code  Association  from  members  from  members  Development
Cooperative  Assn.  (natural  and  micro-loans  Authority
persons)  to members
N G 0 - MFIs  Private  Law on Trusts  Non-profit  Grants, donations,  Microfinance  Annual Reports  None  Individuals and
Trustees  and Non-Profit  Foundation /  comm'l loans  loans to  to SEC and  groups
Foundations  Private Lending  individuals and  Central Bank
Investor  groups
N G  0 s  Private  Law on Trusts  Non-profit  Grants, donations,  Microfinance  Annual Reports  None  Individuals and
parties  and Non-Profit  Foundation  comm'l loans  loans to  to SEC and BIR  groups
Foundations  individuals and
groups
1756.  The  minimum  capitalization  requirements  at  entry  for  Private  Development  Banks,  Rural  Banks,
Cooperative  Banks, Finance  Companies,  Private  Lending Investors  and Pawnshops  are  significantly
lower than  the levels  set for  Commercial  Banks.  The  operations  of Rural  Banks  and Cooperative
Banks  are  limited  to  a  clearly-defined  geographical  area,  e.g.,  municipality,  province  or
administrative region, and are permitted to offer banking services limited  to savings and time deposits
and  loans.  Unlike  the  Rural  Banks  of  Ghana,  the  ownership  and  voting  control  structures  of
Philippine Rural  Banks and Cooperative  Banks are  based  on cumulative  ownership  of share capital,
rather than the one share-one vote structure of their Ghanaian counterparts.
57.  Individual  members  are the mutual  owners  of Non-Stock  Savings and Loan Associations  and of the
Credit Unions, Savings and Credit Cooperatives  and Multipurpose  Cooperatives  which are registered
under the  Cooperative Code  and  subject to regulatory jurisdiction of the Cooperative  Development
Authority  (CDA).  Unlike  Ghana,  these  cooperative  financial  institutions  (CFIs)  are  outside  the
regulatory  and supervisory jurisdiction of the BSP, as well as of the deposit insurance system.  There
is  a  significant  number  of large  CFIs  whose  membership/client  base,  institutional  capital  funds,
deposit resources and asset size are even larger than those of licensed thrift and rural banks.
58.  Many NGOs,  organized by private parties as trust entities or charitable  institutions  under the Law on
Trusts  and  Charitable  Institutions,  provide both  microloans  and nonfinancial  services.  Their credit
activities  are  not regulated  or supervised  by external  government  agencies.  A significant number of
NGOs  and MFIs  belong to an umbrella organization  -- the Microfinance  Council of the Philippines,
which disseminate  best practice guidelines  and standards  for governance, operations  and performance
efficiency.
59.  As there is a lack of clarity  about the legitimacy of credit operations of NGOs, a number of them have
sought to obtain legitimacy by registering themselves  with the SEC under the authorization  category
of  Private  Lending  Investor.  Private  Lending  Investors  and  Pawnshops  are  formally  organized
entities,  in the  sense  that they  are  entities  registered  with  the  SEC,  which  is  the  central  registry
agency.  Pawnshops are required to be authorized and licensed by the BSP.
60.  Traders, input-suppliers,  money-lenders,  ROSCAs and ASCAs constitute the informal segment of the
market for microfinance  in the Philippines.
Lezal and Regulatory Framework for Microfinance
61.  Weaknesses  in Legal  System  and Judicial Processes.13 The Philippine  legal  system is  a hybrid,
reflecting the country's  cultural  and colonial history.  The system combines elements  of Roman  law
from  Spain,  Anglo-American  common  law  introduced  by  the  U.S.,  as  well  as  customary  legal
traditions practiced  by the minorities  (e.g.,  Islamic  law).  The influence  of Spanish  law  is evident in
aspects  of  civil  law,  including  family  relations,  property  matters  and  contracts.  US  law  has
influenced constitutional  and corporate  law - especially  taxation, commerce, labor relations, currency
and banking,  as  well as  rules of evidence  and  government  operations.  In  the Muslim areas  of the
south, Islamic law is utilized.
62.  The Judicial Reorganization  Act of 1981 provides  for four main levels  of courts - (i) metropolitan,
municipal  and municipal  circuit trial courts at the local level which deal with the majority of criminal
and civil cases; (ii) regional trial courts which deal with more serious criminal  and civil cases;  (iii) the
Intermediate  Appellate  Court  which deals  with appeals  from local  and  regional  courts,  and  major
commercial  cases;  and (iv) the Supreme  Court which  hears appeals  from the Intermediate  Appellate
Court  in  criminal  cases.  The  Supreme  Court  has  jurisdiction  over  cases  affecting  government
ministers,  petitions for  injunctions  and habeas corpus writs,  as well as appellate jurisdiction  over the
constitutionality  of any  treaty,  law,  presidential  decree,  proclamation,  order  or  regulation.  The
13  "Philippines: Legal System (A)", Oxford Analytica Brief,  July 7, 2000.
18Supreme  Court also  regulates  the practice  of law,  promulgates  rules on  admission  to the  Bar,  and
disciplines lawyers.
63.  Successful and sustainable business investment relies on legal systems that uphold the rule of law and
an independent judiciary, which  underlie important commercial  settings such as intellectual  property
rights  protection,  contract  enforcement  and  private  property  rights.  Legal  processes  have  been
characterized  by  inefficiency,  long  delays  and  undue  political  influence  - especially  after judicial
independence  was  seriously  compromised  by  the Marcos  dictatorship.  Legal  system  needs  to  be
further  modernized  and  automated  in  order  to  facilitate  creation/registration/execution  of  security
interest  on  pledged  collateral,  eliminate  duplicate/multiple  pledging  of  collateral,  and  facilitate
introduction  of securitized  financial  instruments  that can  benefit microfinance  development  through
better connection  to and linkages with formal sector institutions.
64.  Highlights  of  the  Regulatory  Framework.  A  tiered  structure  of institutions  and  graduated
regulation  existed even before  the government  gave formal recognition  to microfinance  in  1997  and
through  the  new  BSP  regulations  pertaining  specifically  to  microfinance.  BSP  Circular  No.  272,
series of 2001 defines microfinance  loans as "...  small loans granted to the basic sectors, as defined in
the Social  Reform and Poverty Alleviation  Act of 1997 (Republic Act 8425), and other loans granted
to the poor and low-income  households  for their microenterprises  and small businesses so as to enable
them to raise their income levels and improve  their living standards.  These loans are granted on the
basis of the borrowers'  cash flows and  are  typically  unsecured.  The maximum principal  amount of
microfinance  loans  shall  not  exceed  P 150,000  ...  [which]  is  equivalent  to  the  maximum
capitalization  of microenterprise  under R.A.8425.  The schedule  of loan amortizations  shall take into
consideration  the  projected  cash  flow  of  the  borrowers,  which  is  adopted  into  the  terms  and
conditions  formulated.  Hence microfinance  loans may be amortized  on a daily,  weekly,  bi-monthly
or monthly basis, depending  on the cash flow conditions of the borrowers."
65.  The newly-adopted  formal policies  on  microfinance  and the adoption  of a  regulatory  framework
specific  to  microfinance  activities  co-exist  on  a  parallel  basis  with  a  credit-quota  system  for
agricultural  credit  and  SME  finance.  However,  under  the provisions  of BSP  Circular  No.  272,
series  of 2001,  microfinance  loans  shall be considered  in compliance  with required  loans  to small
and medium enterprises required  under R.A.6977.
66.  The  regulatory  (and  tax)  preferences  enjoyed  by  thrift  banks,  rural  banks,  and  credit  unions  in
combination  with  the operation of a graduated/tiered  system have  made  it easier  for NGO  MFIs to
transform  into  licensed  institutions.  This  has  been  an  indispensable  element  for  substantially
expanding the ability of MFIs to mobilize financial resources  beyond traditional  grants and donations.
67.  However,  the continued coexistence  of a targeted  credit quota system is detrimental to microfinance,
and  further  policy  clarification  on  this  matter  is  indispensable.  The BSP  continues  to  coordinate
closely  with the  microfinance  community  in developing regulatory  standards  that can  help  promote
institutional  growth  of  the  microfinance  industry,  and  is  seriously  considering  ways  to  simplify
prudential  standards/guidelines  including  a manual  for examination  of the microfinance  business  of
licensed  banks.  A  significant  development  in  1997  was  the adoption  of the  National  Strategy  for
Microfinance  in  which  the  private  sector  is  to play  a major  role  while  government's  role  is to  be
limited  to  establishing  the  enabling  environment  for  efficient  functioning  of markets.  One  of the
guiding  principles  of this  strategy  is  the  withdrawal  of government  line agencies  in  implementing
credit and guarantee programs, and the clear distinction between  access to credit on commercial terms
versus welfare-oriented policies  and programs.
68.  Most  of  the  rural  finance  and  MFIs  which  are  registered  with  and  licensed  by  the  BSP  - some
categories  of  thrift  banks,  rural  banks  and  cooperative  banks  and  CFIs  which  are  beyond  BSP
jurisdiction - are not directly included in the central clearing  and payments  system.  They participate
in the central  systems for clearing  and payments through the larger commercial  banks.
1969.  A significant number of CFIs are supposed to be regulated  by a  government agency  -- the CDA,  as
well as by their voluntary second-tier  and third-tier federations.  The technical  and resource capacity
of the CDA to effectively  monitor and regulate  CFIs are severely restricted.  Insofar as the  second-
tier and third-tier federations  are concerned,  there are CFIs which do not belong to any of the several
regional  and national federations.  In addition,  the operational  structure of CFIs generally  has greater
affinity  to  banking  institutions,  and competition  in  the same  local  communities  among  banks  and
CFIs has increased.
70.  A  number of CFIs have  taken  advantage  of the liberal  provisions  in Philippine  cooperative  laws to
change their organizational  structure  into "community-development"  credit unions, which legitimizes
their reaching out to entire municipalities to expand their membership  or client base.  CFIs are larger
in number, and in terms of client  base and asset size bigger than NGO MFIs and cooperative  banks,
but  are  beyond  BSP jurisdiction.  This  increases  the  vulnerability  of large  numbers  of the  lower
income  population to systemic risks since  their savings and time deposits with their CFIs are in turn
kept  by the  latter  with  formal  banking  system,  and  there  is no mandatory  inclusion  in  the formal
deposit protection  system.
71.  All licensed banks  are participants  in the Philippine Deposit Insurance System  which constitutes the
formal  deposit protection  framework for depositors in licensed banks - up to a maximum amount of
Php  100,000 (US$2,000)  in deposits.  Banks are assessed  a fee at the rate of 0.5%  of their average
deposit  liabilities  and the fee is collected  quarterly.  Under  the provisions  of the Deposit Insurance
Law,  the Philippine  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (PDIC)  exercises  auxiliary  and  supplementary
prudential  supervision  authority  over  licensed  banks,  with  the  authority  and  power  to  exclude
imprudent banks from the deposit protection system.
72.  Prudential standards.  The risk management  criteria considered by BSP as  important for MFIs and
the adjustments made to recognize characteristics of microfinance operations  are discussed below.
•  Capital adequacy.  The  minimum  capitalization  requirements  for licensed  institutions  with  a
specialized  microfmance  focus  - Private  Development  Banks,  Rural  Banks  and  Cooperative
Banks  - are  significantly  lower than those  for conmmercial  banks  and  savings banks.  The rural
finance/MFIs,  whose  banking services  are  limited  to savings  and time  deposits  and loans  for a
market and client base limited to defined geographical  areas  (province- or region-wide  only)  are
required to have a paid-up capital based on the market area covered.  The paid-up capital for rural
banks and cooperative  banks ranges  from US$50,000 to US$260,000  depending on the class of
municipality  or  metropolitan  area  the  bank  is  located  in.  Thrift  banks  operating  outside  the
Metropolitan  Manila  area are required  to have US$1.0  million  in paid-up  capital,  and  US$6.5
million  if the head-office  is  in Metropolitan  Manila  area.  By  way of comparison,  the paid-up
capital  requirement  for  universal  banks  is  US$100  million,  and  US$48  million  for  regular
commercial banks.
X  Solvency  standards.  The  solvency  standard  established  by BSP  for these  licensed  financial
institutions  is  unimpaired  capital base  equivalent to at least  10%  of risk assets.  The new  Risk-
Based Capital  Adequacy guidelines  established by the Monetary  Board of the BSP follows  the
Basle  risk-based  capital  adequacy  framework.  The latter recommends  a minimum  level of 8%
incorporating  both credit  risks  and  market risks.  Supplemental  guidelines  on  classification  of
assets based on market risk have not yet been issued.
*  Mandatory liquidity reserves.  BSP prescribes  the primary  and  secondary  reserve  assets  that
licensed  deposit-taking  institutions are required  to hold, relative  to an institution's  total  deposit
liabilities.  Under present BSP regulations on mandatory liquidity reserves,  thrift banks and rural
banks  continue to enjoy  preferential  reserve  requirement  levels,  relative to universal  banks  and
regular commercial  banks.
20*  Security  for loans.  Current prudential  guidelines  require  licensed  banks to properly  document
their loans  and to have such  loans  secured with  collateral.  The risk-based  classification  of loan
assets takes into account  the type and realizable value of supporting collateral.  BSP has, in recent
years, recognized that collateral-based  loans are generally beyond  the reach of poor households in
the rural and urban areas.  Close coordination  between  the BSP, the National Credit Council  and
the  Coalition  for  Microfinance  Standards  has  led  to  a  better  understanding  of the  cash-flow
orientation  of  the  operations  of  microenterprises  and  small  businesses,  characteristics  of
microfinance  loans,  and  best  practices  in  microfinance  lending  (e.g.,  group  guarantees  as
acceptable  collateral  in  microfinance  loans).  To  implement  the  provisions  of  the  General
Banking  Law of 2000 concerning  microfinance,  the BSP  recently  approved  BSP Circulars  No.
272  and 273,  series  2001.  Circular 273  partially  lifts  the general  moratorium on  establishment
and licensing  of new thrift and rural banks focused on microfinance,  while Circular 272 provides
clear prudential  guidelines for relief from the standard regulatory  approach to loan administration
and collateral requirements.
*  Recognition  and  classification  of  delinquent  loans.  All  licensed  financial  institutions  are
required to monitor and review their portfolio of credit and risk assets at least once every quarter
on a regular basis.  Assets are  classified  into four  grades of risk:  (i) standard;  (ii) sub-standard;
(iii) doubtful;  and (iv)  loss.  Assets in risk grades  (ii) to (iv) are considered  non-performing  and
therefore  no income  may be  accrued on them.  BSP is presently  drawing  up specific  prudential
norms for  microenterprise  and small business finance which  take into account the characteristics
of the enterprises and businesses in these two categories.
*  Provisioning  for  portfolio  at  risk.  Classification of loan  Rale of pro'. isioning
Provisioning  for  delinquent  loans  is
made  on  an  individual  loan  basis  -~ Loans especially mentioned  5%
(rather  than  the  "basket-based"  Substandard loans:
approach  permissible  in  Ghana  for  With collateral  6%  -25%
licensed  MFIs).  BSP's prescribed  rate  Without collateral  25%
of  provisioning  for  loans,  including  Doubtful  5...%  .........  .......-  ... ..--.- '.  ~~~~Doubtful  i50% microfinance  and  small  business  loans  .....  . _  _  ............-  - --  .......  ...............  _._._  .. _._......  ..... _  .....
is shown.  Probable  loss  100%
In addition to the specific  loss provisions to be made for delinquent or non-performing  loans, BSP
requires  licensed banks  to maintain  a general  loss  provision  equivalent to 2%  of the gross loan
portfolio,  net of inter-bank  loans  and loans  considered  non-risk  under current regulations  (e.g.,
loans fully secured by hold-out on deposits).  Financial institutions  are also required to separately
disclose, in their financial  accounts and reports, the specific and general  loss provisions  made for
non-performing  delinquent  loans and standard/current loan assets.
*  Guidelines  and standards for  writing-off  of  non-performing  loans.  The  general  practice
among licensed banks  is to write off non-performing  or delinquent loans at the time that the loan
loss is confirmed.  It does  not appear that BSP has specified  a procedure covering the mandatory
writing off of non-performing  loans.  A standard procedure  and timing that triggers off mandatory
write-off  would obviously be impacted  by the  ability (or lack  thereof)  of MFIs to  comply with
capital adequacy and loan loss reserve requirements.
VIII  ASSESSMENT  OF PHILIPPINE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
MICROFINANCE
73.  In  recent years,  the Philippine  Government  has given  high-level  recognition  to the importance  and
21relevance  of rnicrofinance  - adoption  of National  Policy on  Microfinance  in  1997, recent  specific
inclusion  of  microfinance  policy  and  activity  in  the  amended  General  Banking  Law  (2000),
promulgation  of microfinance-friendly  BSP circulars  on microfinance  transactions  by licensed  banks
and NBFIs.
74.  The regulatory framework  is so structured as to provide room for NGO MFIs  to establish viable links
with the formal financial  sector and to become properly licensed financial institutions  at several entry
and  progression  levels  --  Cooperative  Banks,  Rural  Banks,  Thrift  Banks  and  "quasi-banks".
Capitalization levels at entry are periodically  reviewed by BSP to determine if the levels are either too
high  or too low.  The approach,  which has thus far worked,  is based on considerations  of the market
in  which  an  applicant  bank intends  to  operate  - category  of the municipality,  based  on  municipal
revenue  as  a  proxy  variable  the  community's  aggregate  income  level;  as  well  as  the  projected
business  volumes  for  the  applicant  bank  (which  tracks  the  relationship  between  planned/expected
asset size vis-a-vis capital adequacy levels).
75.  Reforms in the legal system and judicial  processes  need  to be made  in order to catch up and keep in
step  with  growth  of the  microfinance  industry.  There  are  still  significant  obstacles  and problems
related  to  recognizing  and  protecting  security  interest  in  pledged  collateral,  which  could  facilitate
MFIs'  access  to  capital  markets  through financial  securities  (capital  market  instruments).  This  is
considered important because the Philippines has a capital market that is rapidly developing.
76.  MFIs  licensed  by BSP  as  banking  institutions  are  included  in  the  formal  deposit  insurance  system
and,  in principle,  are  subject  to  examination  by PDIC  for compliance  with/observation  of prudent
operating  standards.  NBFIs  in microfinance  are subject  to regulations  of BSP [if performing  quasi-
banking] and/or SEC [if not engaged in quasi-banking].'4
77.  Most  of  the  rural  finance  and  MFIs  which  are  registered  with  and  licensed  by  the  BSP - some
categories  of  thrift  banks,  rural  banks  and  cooperative  banks  and  CFIs  which  are  beyond  BSP
jurisdiction  anyway  - are  not directly  included  in the central  clearing  and payments  system.  They
participate in the central systems for clearing and payments through the larger commercial banks.
78.  The  operational  structure  of CFIs - particularly  the open-bond  associations  -- has greater affinity  to
banking  institutions  and  competition  in  the  same  local  communities  among  banks  and  CFIs  has
increased.  A number of CFIs have taken advantage of the liberal provisions  in Philippine cooperative
laws  to  change  their  organizational  structure  into  "community-development"  credit  unions,  which
legitimizes their reaching out to entire municipalities  to expand their membership  or client base.  The
liberal provisions make it fairly easy for a closed-bond  CFI to change into an open-bond CFI.
79.  CFIs are  larger  in number,  and  in terms  of client  base  and asset  size  bigger  than  NGO  MFIs  and
cooperative banks,  but are beyond BSP jurisdiction.  This  increases the vulnerability  and exposure of
large numbers of the lower income population  to systemic  risks, because  (i) their deposits  with their
CFIs are kept by the latter with institutions in the formal banking system, and (ii) deposit protection is
not  a  universal nor  mandatory practice  among  CFIs and  their federations.  An urgent priority  is  to
squarely  address  the  need for  an  adequate  and  appropriate  framework  for  prudential  regulation  of
CFIs, in such a way that overall regulation  of financial institutions is unified rather than fragmented.
IX  LESSONS LEARNED  FROM EXPERIENCES  OF GHANA AND  THE PHILIPPINES IN
MICROFINANCE  REGULATION
80.  The  tiered  regulatory  approach  has  promoted  the  development  of sustainable  microfinance  in  the
14  NBFls are required  to comply with the "19-LenderRule", which mandates that NBFIs may not borrow from 20
or more lenders  for the purpose of re-lending or purchase of receivables or  othter obligations.
22Philippines  and Ghana,  by clearly identifying pathways  for NGOs and semi-formal  MFIs to become
legitimate  institutions  under  the  regulatory  framework  with  greater  ability  to  access  financial
resources from commercial markets.  The foremost examples  for Ghana and the Philippines  are:
a.  CARD Rural  Bank in  the Philippines  which was  formed  by the  Center for Agricultural  and
Rural  Development,  an  NGO  working  with  women  in  rural  villages  under  a  group-based
microfinance  model.
b.  Opportunity  Microfinance  Bank,  which was  established  recently  as  a joint effort between  the
APPEND network of Philippine  NGO microcredit institutions and Opportunity  International.
c.  Sinapi  Aba Trust in  Ghana,  a  successful  and sustainable  NGO MFI  operating  in the Kumasi
region,  which  is  trying  to  transform  into  a  licensed  community  bank  with  assistance  from
Opportunity  International,  but is facing new obstacles of higher minimum capital requirements.
d.  Similar to the  Philippines,  Indonesia's  regulatory  framework  (see Annex)  has  allowed  for the
establishment  of  smaller  but  licensed  unit  banks  - BPRs,  or  rural  credit  banks.  Larger
microfinance  NGOs  such  as  Bina  Swadaya  and  Catholic  Relief  Services  have  established,
through  equity  investments  and  credit  lines,  their  own  networks  of  BPR  units  providing
microfinance  services to the poor in urban and rural areas.
81.  Among  the risks  that a  graduated and tiered regulatory  framework may present is  that of  regulatory
arbitrage.  Investors  and stakeholders  in a financial  institution  seeking  to be authorized and licensed
might choose to be  established  and constituted  under  an institutional  format which  is subject to least
possible external regulation  and supervision,  as well as the lowest possible amount of capitalization  at
entry.  This does not appear to have been experienced  by the Philippines  nor Ghana,  with respect  to
the MFIs obtaining status as licensed specialized banks.
82.  Ghana  and  the  Philippines  have  a  comparatively  wide  range  of  informal,  semi-formal  and formal
institutions with  the provision  of microfinance  services  as their principal line of business.  Indonesia
has  an  even  varied  range  of MFIs.  The  legal  and  regulatory  environment  in  these  three  countries
have,  for  many  years,  permitted  the  establishment  of specialized  institutions  with  limited  financial
intermediation  activities  in geographical  areas  with  defined  limits.  More  recently,  the government
authorities  in Ghana  and  the  Philippines  have moved  forward to  articulate  a  vision and  strategy for
microfinance  and its role in poverty  alleviation  programs,  making  adjustments  in their banking  and
financial  laws  and  regulations.  The  principal  characteristics  of  the  framework  for  regulating
microfinance  activities  in Ghana and the Philippines  are highlighted in Table 5 below.
83.  In  contrast  to the Philippines  and  Ghana,  a primary  challenge for the Indonesian  government  is to
craft  a coherent  vision and  strategy  for microfinance  development  as an integral  part of the  urgent
need to reform  and restructure  the  financial  sector.  In  the aftermath  of the  economic  and  financial
crisis that the country encountered  in recent  years, it is remarkable  that Indonesia's  main rural/MFIs
have weathered  the crisis with relatively  non-severe  repercussions on their client base and operations
- in  spite of a fragmented  regulatory  structure and some degree of ambiguity in the policy framework
for rural/microfinance.
84.  While  Ghana,  the  Philippines  and  Indonesia  all  have  licensed  rural  banks  their  relative  financial
performance and sustainability  profiles have differed significantly - largely because of differences in
effective governance by owners/stakeholders  and the base of unimpaired capital and ability of owners
to step forward with additional capital.
23Table 5.  Mficrofinance  Regulatory Framework:  Ghana and the Philippines
Ghana  Philippines
Continuum of MFIs  Wide range of unregulated and regulated  Wide range of unregulated  and regulated
MFIs  MFIs
REGULATED / LICENSED MFIs  REGULATED / LICENSED MFIs
*  Finance  Companies  *  Thrift Banks
*  Community/Rural Banks  *  Rural Banks
*  S & L Companies  *  Cooperative Banks
*  CFIs (Credit Unions)  *  Private Lending Investors
UNREGULATED / UNLICENSED MFIs  *  Pawnshops
*  NGOs  UNREGULATED / UNLICENSED MFIs
*  Susu Clubs & Collectors  *  NGOs
*  ROSCAs and ASCAs  *  Credit Unions / Savings  and Credit units
of Cooperatives
*  Village "banks" (Solidarity Groups)
*  ROSCAs and ASCAs
Strategy for  *  Adopted National Strategic  *  Adopted National Policy on
Developing  Framework  for the Microfinance  Microfinance  (1997-98)
Sustainable  Sector (1999-2000)  *  Established Central Policy Coordination
Microfinance  *  Established Central Policy  Office at  Department of Finance and at
Coordination  Office at  Ministry of  Bangko Sentral
Finance  *  Introducing amendments  to banking  laws
*  Introducing amendments to banking  and regulations responsive to
laws and regulations responsive  to  microfinance  (minimum capitalization
microfinance  (minimum  and adequacy requirements;  liquidity
capitalization  & adequacy  management  standards; loan collateral,
requirements;  liquidity management  classification  and loss provisioning
standards; loan collateral,  guidelines)
classification  and loss provisioning  *  Simplifying (1) reporting standards,
guidelines)  chart of accounts; (2) external audit
*  Simplifying (1) reporting standards,  requirements;  (3) microfinance  manual
chart of accounts;  (2) external audit  for Central Bank examiners  and
requirements; (3) microfinance  inspectors
manual for Central Bank examiners
and inspectors
Missing Links and  *  Community ownership of rural banks  *  Fragmented regulatory framework:
Regulatory  obstructs internal prudential  Cooperative Financial Institutions are
Weaknesses  governance and  management  outside (1)  Central Bank jurisdiction, (2)
controls  formal deposit insurance system
*  Need to integrate  *  Need to integrate unregulated/unlicensed
unregulated/unlicensed  MFIs into  MFIs into payments infrastructure
payments infrastructure  *  Accelerate capacity building for staffs of
*  Accelerate capacity building for  Regulatory Authority and MFIs
staffs of Regulatory Authority and
MFIs
24a.  In  Ghana's  rural  banking  system,  the  rural  banks  are  owned  by  all  the  members  of  a
community.  The  rural  banks  are  therefore  quasi-cooperative  organizations,  where  each
shareholder/resident  has  one  vote.  Because  the  value  of  the  single  share  held  by  a
shareholder/resident  is  so low  at  Ghana  ¢50  (roughly  about  US$  0.007  equivalent),  there  is
correspondingly  little financial commitment,  management  interest and ownership control from
the "owners-at-large".  The format for ownership of rural banks in Ghana is deficient,  unwieldy
and  not  conducive  to  institutional  sustainability,  and  some  other  format  which  permits
identifiable,  qualified  investor/stakeholders  to  own,  control  and  manage  these  community-
based  financial  institutions  may  have  a  better  chance  of  developing  into  viable  financial
institutions.
b.  Individual  shareholders  own the rural  banks in the Philippines  (although cooperative banks are
owned not by natural persons but by cooperative  entities), who have  a proportionate  degree of
control  and  ownership  interest  in the  management,  operations  and  results  of the  rural  bank
based on their equity ownership position.
c.  For  Indonesia,  the  more  successful  rural  banks  (BPRs)  appear  to be  mostly  those  that have
been organized,  funded and managed  by  identifiable individuals  as  shareholders  - while most
of the  less successful  and weaker BPRs are generally  the village-based  institutions  that were
decreed by government to be licensed banks.
d.  The procedures  enforced by the central  bank regulatory  authorities  in  Ghana,  the  Philippines
and  Indonesia  include  assessment  and  evaluation  of  directors  and  officers  of  banking
institutions subject to licensing - the "fit and proper" test.
85.  Indonesia imposes nationalitv  requirements on the ownership and control of rural banks, which create
a significant  barrier to entry.  Ownership  of shares of stock in rural banks is reserved  exclusively  for
Indonesian  citizens  or  legal  entities  owned  and  controlled  by  Indonesian  citizens.  For  sustainable
rural/MFIs  with  the  potential  to  transform  into  licensed  rural  banks,  this  requirement  effectively
eliminates  the possibility  of attracting  international  NGOs  and similar organizations  which,  in other
countries,  constitute  a rnajor  source  of additional  capital funds  to  support  sustainable  growth  and
expanded outreach  for a MFI.
86.  The  adjustments  to  risk  management  criteria  made  by  BOG  and  BSP  recognize  the  special
characteristics  of microfinance  operations  and  provide  useful  lessons  for regulatory  authorities  in
other countries.
*  Required  minimum  capital  and  capital adequacy  levels.  Minimum  capitalization  levels  at
entry,  and  required  levels  of unimpaired  paid-in capital  were  set  at levels  lower than those  for
regular commercial or development banks,  even though the mandatory capital adequacy ratio was
uniform for all licensed banking  and nonbank financial  institutions.  Especially in the case of the
Philippines  and Indonesia, and less so for Ghana,  required levels  of capitalization at entry and of
unimpaired  capital after entry have been subjected to review,  and adjusted  from time to time  to
recognize  changing economic and market conditions.
a.  There are clear indications  from the Philippine experience that the required minimum levels
set  for  entry  took  into  account  the  size  of the  market  and  the  volume  of intermediation
business that different types of MFIs would be generating,  because most MFIs - when they
are  formed  - will  operate  only  within  determined  geographical  areas,  rather  than  on  a
nationwide basis.
b.  With respect  to capital adequacy  standards,  the prudential  levels  set for licensed  MFIs  by
the banking authorities in the Philippines, Indonesia  and Ghana do not differ much from the
levels  set  for  the  larger  commercial  and  thrift  banking  institutions  in  those  countries.
25Shareholders  of licensed  MFIs  may  have  greater  difficulty  in putting  together  additional
resources  in  the  event  of a call  for additional  capital  mandated  by the banking  authority.
Thus, it would be justifiable to support the case for a more conservative  approach that sets a
higher capital adequacy  level for MFIs, in spite of the argument that higher levels result in
less efficient use of capital.
c.  Global best practice experience of MFIs reporting their operating and financial performance
data to the MicroBanking  Bulletin provide clear empirical evidence to support more prudent
capital  adequacy  standards  for  MFIs.  As  shown  in  Table  6  below,  data  from  the
MicroBanking  Bulletin  indicate  that the  ratio of unimpaired  capital to average  total assets
ranges  from a  low of 20% to as much as 60%  for MFIs in different regions, with  different
operational  and  organizational  formats.  The  data  also  shows  that  the  asset-to-capital
leveraging  of reporting  MFIs,  which  would be much  lower  than the  10%  to  15%  capital
adequacy level generally  maintained by commercial banks, has enabled  the  MFIs to access
borrowed funds at commercial rates as additional resources to fund their loan portfolios.
Table 6.  Financial Profde of Selected MFIs (In %)
Operating self-  Externalfunds/
Region  Capi4allassels  sufficiency  loans 0
Africa  51.6%  88.8 %  51.7 %
Asia  48.5  109.8  40.7
... _._...  ...  _...._.  . __  ....  . ..  ......  ....._._.__.........  _  _..  ........  ....  ._  ... 
Latin America  44.2  113.8  44.4
Eastern Europe  54.2  107.4  146.5
Organizaoionalformais
Bank  20.3  107.6  106.0
Non-Bank Fl  46 5  96.4  52 2
Credit Union  34.7  109.3  67.7
NGO  59.5  106.4  41.6
¢  External Funds/  Loans = Borrowed Funds @  commercial  rates / Average Loan Portfolio
Source:  The MicroBankine Bulletin. Issue no. 6 (April 2001), Tables A and B
*  The  mandatory  procedures  for recognition  and classification  of delinquent  loans  are  being
reviewed  for the possibility of taking into account  the nature and cycles  of microenterprises  and
small  businesses;  the  characteristics  of microfinance  loans  - especially  in terms  of  acceptable
collateral  and repayment patterns; and the short-term maturity profile of microfinance  loans
*  Provisioning for portfolio at risk in the case of Ghana took into account the comparatively  more
numerous,  smaller principal amount,  and shorter maturity cycles of microfinance loans.  "Basket-
based"  provisioning,  instead  of  individual  loan  provisioning,  was  adopted  as  the  acceptable
approach.  This basket-based  loan classification  and provisioning  approach  is more practical and
less  complicated  and costly,  compared  to the prevailing  practice  of identifying,  classifying  and
provisioning  on  an individual  loan  basis.  In addition,  the general  reserve  for microfinance  loan
losses, in the case of Ghana,  is set at a level higher than that for regular commercial loans.
87.  In  working  with  a  tiered  structure  of financial  institutions  and  a  tiered  regulatory  structure,  the
regulatory experiences  of Ghana and the Philippine provide important lessons  as regards the threshold
levels of microfinance intermediation  activities which trigger the need for external regulation.
26*  Informal  entities.  External  regulation has  not been required for informal  sector entities  such as
Self Help  Groups  (SHGs),  ROSCAs,  ASCAs,  susu  clubs  and  susu  collectors,  and  informally
organized groups  such as village banks which do not access funds beyond members'  savings kept
within the group.
*  Registration  as  basic  regulation.  The most  basic  form of regulation  is standard  registration,
covering  documents  of establishment  and governance  structure.  This applies  to all MFIs which
access  funds  from  donors,  government  agencies,  commercial  banks  -- in the  same  manner that
other business and social organizations  are required to establish status as legal entities.
*  Monitoring  through  standard periodic  reports  constitutes  a  higher  tier  in  the  regulatory
structure,  and  often  applies  to  institutions  engaged  in financial  intermediation  which  does  not
include  retail  deposit-taking  activities.  Banking laws  govern the  mobilization  of retail  deposits
from  the  public,  but  apply  only  to  voluntary deposits  and  do  not  cover  forced  savings  or
mandatory deposit schemes specifically  tied to loan contracts.
*  Limited-license  bank  and  non-bank  MFIs  may  be  organized  as  a  non-bank  intermediary,
financing  company,  or specialized  or limited bank with  a limited license  which permits deposit-
taking  activities  from  the  general  public.  Generally,  this  is  limited  to  a multiple  of its  total
qualifying  capital  and generally  excludes  the ability  to  create demand  deposits,  with operations
limited  to  a  defined  area.  Such  an  MFI  may  need  to  comply  with  higher  capital  adequacy
guidelines  and resulting  lower  leverage  multiples,  with limits  on  services  and  operations.  The
more restrictive  limits on capital adequacy are consistent  with restrictions on  deposit-taking  and,
by reducing the comparative  return on equity, serve as a preventive measure against opportunistic
behavior by investors  seeking gains through regulatory  arbitrage.
*  Full  offsite  and  onsite  supervision  is appropriate  for  licensed  banks,  which  are  permitted  to
mobilize retail  deposits from the general  public.  They are  subject to licensing  requirements  and
full prudential  supervision  by the  regulatory  authorities,  particularly  their compliance  with and
observance  of capital  adequacy,  risk-asset  classification  and  leverage,  loan  classification  and
provisioning  standards, concentration of loans and deposits and deposit insurance enrollment.
OTHER REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK  ISSUES
Remulatin'  Cooperative  Financial Institutions
88.  CFIs  comprise  membership-based  institutions  based  on  closed-bond  or  open-bond  relationships:
"closed-bond"  CFIs  limit membership  to  a  clearly  defined  group  of persons  and generally  have  a
limited  scale  of operation  in  terms  of geography  and size of client/membership  base.  "Open-bond"
CFIs draw  their membership  not from  a specifically defined  group and tend to be larger  in  scope of
operations and deposit volume.'5
89.  The prudential  supervision of CFIs is  an important responsibility that is often not addressed  properly
nor adequately.  Very often CFIs,  like other cooperative  associations,  are perceived  as social  welfare
organizations,  and their financial  supervision  is not given a high priority, because their small size and
sometimes  remote  location  makes  supervision  costly.  A  common  argument  is  that  CFIs  are
5  William R. Emmons and Franck  A. Schmid provide a rigorous  examination of the on-going debate (in the U.S.)
concerning  fields of membership, i.e.,  common bonds, based on theoretical models of credit union formation
and consolidation and the empirical evidence on the relationships between potential credit union membership
vis-i-vis credit union participation rates.  See their paper,  "Credit Unions and the Common Bond",  in the
Federal  Reserve Bank of St.  Louis Review,  September/October 1999.
27cooperatives,  owned  and  operated  by  members  transacting  only  among  themselves,  and  therefore
should be regulated by agencies responsible for other types of cooperatives.
90.  In reality,  however,  CFIs  are  more  like  banking  institutions  than  other types  of cooperatives  (e.g.,
agricultural  production,  marketing,  or  service  cooperatives).  CFIs  are  diversified  financial
intermediaries  providing  financial services  to virtually  all  sectors  - commerce,  agriculture,  industry
and services  - of a  local  economy.  Their  operations  may  be concentrated  in the  micro  and  small
enterprise  segments  of the  market  but  in most  cases,  they  fund  their operations  from  community
savings and thus must compete for deposits  with other types of financial intermediaries  in the locality
- especially  licensed  banking  institutions.  Consequently,  CFIs  confront  the  same  types  of risks
similar to other shareholder-owned  financial institutions.16
91.  CFIs, for their institutional  benefit as well  as for their member-owners,  would be far better regulated
by those trained  to supervise  banks and other financial  institutions  - a task that requires  specialized
technical skills in order to properly safeguard the savings of members.  Thus, banking authorities in a
number of countries are carefully assessing whether to place CFIs (especially those where the number
of members, level of assets and loans, and volume  of deposits have begun to approach or even exceed
those for small licensed banks) under the jurisdiction of a central regulatory  authority for banks.17
92.  Good  practice  prudential  supervision  for MFIs  calls  for modifications  in  the  methods  customarily
used  by  regulatory  authorities  for  commercial  bank  supervision  in  a  number  of  key  areas  -
particularly those closely related to the nature and characteristics  of the business activities serviced  by
MFIs.  With respect  to CFIs,  the areas  in which effective  CFI supervision  will diverge  significantly
from  best  practice  commercial  bank  supervision  center  on  the  impact  of  CFI  characteristics:
borrower  domination,  external  funding  sources,  non-professional/volunteer  credit committees,  fixed
asset  levels,  and  quality  of staff due  to  low-salaried  or  volunteer  staff.  The  main  approaches  to
regulation and prudential  supervision of CFIs (which is also applicable  to MFIs  in general),' 8 and  the
strengths and deficiencies of each approach  are summarized below:
a.  Direct prudential  supervision by the public sector supervisory  authority.  This approach  is the
most desirable  because  the protection of the small but numerous  depositors is fundamentally a
function  appropriate  for  the  public  sector.  Moreover,  the  approach  avoids  the  conflict-of-
interest problem which arises from prudential supervision delegated to a CFI federation or MFI
umbrella  organization.  The  approach  is  likewise  the  only  one  that  achieves  unification  of
supervisory  jurisdiction  over  financial  intermediation  activities  across  the  widest  range  of
financial  intermediary  institutions.  The principal drawback to direct prudential  supervision by
the  public  sector  regulatory  authority  is  often  the  scarcity  of trained  supervisory  staff  and
resources of most central supervisory authorities.
b.  Auxiliary  prudential  supervision  as in the  German  system of credit  union supervision,  where
the supervision  is  carried  out  by two or more regional  credit union  auditing  federations  - so
16  Jeffrey Poyo,  "Regulation and Supervision of Credit Unions", in Glenn D.  Westley and Brian Branch (eds.),
Safe Money: Building Effective  Credit Unions in Latin America.  Johns Hopkins University Press (for Inter-
American Development Bank and World Council of Credit Unions): Washington, DC, 2000.
17  The experience of Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Albania, Ghana  and the Philippines  illustrates  this new thinking.
18  See:  Matthias Arzbach and  Alvaro Durdn,  Regulaci6n y Supervisi6n de Cooperativas  de Ahorro v Credito en
America Latina.  DGRV.:  San Jose, Costa Rica, Junio 2000, pp. 8 -10; and Helmut Pabst, "Mejores Prdcticas
en la Supervisio'n de las Cooperativas  de Ahorro y Credito  ", exposicion en la Ira. Convenci6n de Cooperativas
Ahorro y  Credito del Peru, Lima, Peru, 17-19 octubre del 2001.  Confederaci6n Alemana de  Cooperativas
(DGRV):  Lima, Peru, octubre 2001.
28that a credit union  is  never supervised  by the  very same  federation  it belongs to but rather by
the  other  federation.  The  German  experience  highlights  the  results  of many  long  years  of
success  with the system:  the governing  boards  of the federations  are highly  professionalized,
with  many  years  of  specialized  professional  service.  The  federations  do  not  carry  out
promotional  or  lobbying  functions,  which  are  undertaken  by  separate  organizations  (DGRV
and BVR).
c.  Delegated  prudential  supervision,  in which  the  government  regulatory  authority  delegates  the
prudential  supervision  function  to  a  private/non-public  sector  supervisory  entity.  The  ideal
arrangement  is one where the delegated supervisory entity is independent of the credit unions -
even though  this  result  is  most likely difficult  to  achieve.  In  situations  where  the  delegated
private  sector entity is  the CFI federation  or MFI  umbrella  organization,  the most  significant
drawback  is  the  conflict-of-interest  problem  because  the  member  CFIs  or  MFIs  select  the
leadership  and governing board of their federations  or umbrella organizations.
d.  For  a  system  of self-regulation  and  autonomous  supervision  to  work  it is  indispensable  that
there  is  a  set  of  well-founded  prudential  standards,  guidelines  and  practices  which  are
understood  clearly  and conscientiously  observed  by the member entities  of the  CFI federation
or umbrella  organization.  One of the major  weaknesses is the absence  of an  organization and
mechanism for imposing sanctions and penalties for non-compliance  with prudential standards,
fraud,  or  for  carrying  out  intermediation  activities  and  management  practices  that  may  be
harmful to members  and clients as well as to other CFIs or MFIs.
93.  Ghana and the Philippines have different approaches  to regulation and prudential supervision of CFIs.
Ghana's  regulatory  framework  classifies  credit unions'  financial  intermediation  activities  under the
NBFI category subject to the jurisdiction of the Bank of Ghana and prudential supervision  by its Non-
Bank  Financial  Institutions  Department.  In  contrast,  credit  unions  and  savings  and  credit
cooperatives  in  the  Philippines  are  subject  to  regulation  only  by  the  CDA  - an  agency  under  the
Office  of the President.  Since  they  are  outside  the jurisdiction  of BSP as  the  principal  regulatory
authority  for banks  and  financial  institutions,  credit unions  and  savings  and credit  cooperatives  are
excluded from participation  in the Philippine formal deposit insurance  system, and participate in the
central check-clearing  and payments system through licensed banks.
94.  Both Ghana  and  the  Philippines  could  benefit  from  the  experience  of  other  countries  which  have
begun  to  address  the  establishment  of  a  prudential  regulatory  framework  appropriate  for  CFIs  -
although  it must be  pointed  out that the  regulation  and supervision  of MFIs  and CFIs is a relatively
recent development,  even in Latin America.  One such country  is Peru, even though the experience  in
regulating and supervising credit unions  is perhaps  still too new and too limited. 19 Peru has adopted a
hybrid delegated approach to  the  regulation  and  prudential  supervision  of credit  unions,  whereby
they (i) are subject to the Law on Cooperatives,  and (ii)  like banks and other financial intermediaries,
are subject to the provisions  of the laws governing  banks,  finance  companies,  insurance  companies,
and  the  Superintendency  for  Banks  and  Insurance  Companies  (SBS).  The  off-site  and  on-site
9  Peru's regulatory framework for CFIs consists of the  Law  on  Cooperatives (1990); the  General Law  on
Banking, Finance and Insurance Companies (Decree No. 770); and the General Law on the Financial  System,
the Insurance System,  and the Superintendency of Banks and Insurance Companies (Law No.  26702).  CFls
are considered  to befinancial.  intermediaries  and, like banks, finance companies and insurance  companies, are
under the regulatory and prudential  jurisdiction of the Superintendency for Banks and Insurance Companies.
See:  Eduardo Casavilca, "Impacto de la Regulaci6n en las Cooperativas  de Ahorro y  Credito en el Peru'",
exposicion en la Ira. Convenci6n de Cooperativas  Ahorro y  Credito del Peru, Lima,  Peru, 17-19 octubre del
2001.  Superintendencia  de Banca y Seguros: Lima, Peru, octubre 2001.
29supervision  of open-bond  credit unions are carried  out directly by the staff of the SBS.  On the  other
hand,  the  prudential  supervision  of closed-bond  credit  unions  is  undertaken  by a  designated  third-
party entity, the National Federation  of Savings  and Credit Cooperatives of Peru (FENACREP),  for
and  in  behalf  of  the  SBS  under  well-defined  structures  and  mechanisms  for  responsibility  and
accountability.  Any  sanctions  arising  from  non-compliance  with  the  prudential  standards  and
guidelines  issued by the Superintendency,  based on the delegated on-site examination  and supervision
work carried out by FENACREP, are implemented by the SBS itself. 20
Ownership  and Control  of Microfinance Institutions
95.  Regulations  on  permitted forms  of ownership  and control  of MFIs  constitute  significant barriers  to
entry by interested  promoters and organizers  of microfinance  entities into legitimate  operations.  The
banking laws of most  countries require that entities  subject to licensing  must have an organizational
format  as  a  stock  corporation  or  limited  liability  company  --  for  banking  and  other  financial
institutions,  or  as  mutually-owned  cooperative  associations  - for  credit  unions,  savings  and  credit
cooperatives  or  non-stock  savings  and  loan  associations.  Generally,  the  shareholders  in  a  stock
corporation or limited liability company,  or in credit unions  and savings  and credit cooperatives  may
be natural persons or legal entities.  This is the case, for instance, in Ghana and the Philippines.
96.  The  restrictive  barrier  to  entry  is  created  when  the  establishment  rules  and  banking  regulations
specify  that ownership  and control in  authorized  and licensed MFIs  (including  banks)  may  be held
only  by  natural  persons  (as  in  the case  of Honduras,  El  Salvador  and  Indonesia).  An  even  more
restrictive barrier  to entry is constituted by establishment  rules and banking regulations  which specify
that  ownership  and  control  of  authorized  and  licensed  MFIs  (including  banks)  may  be  held
exclusively  by natural  persons who are citizens  (El  Salvador) and/or  legal entities  which are  100%  -
owned by citizens (Indonesia).  A related restrictive  barrier consists of regulations which prohibit the
employment  of  non-citizens  are  directors  or managers  of  authorized  and  licensed  MFIs.  These
restrictive  regulations  on  ownership  and control  effectively  preclude  the  entry  and participation  of
specialized,  experienced  and  financial  resource-endowed  international  organizations  in  the
development  of sustainable microfinance.
Self-Regulatory Orzanizations
97.  Self-regulation  refers  to arrangements  under  which  the primary  responsibility  for  monitoring  and
enforcing prudential norms lies with a body that is controlled by the organizations  to be supervised -
usually a member-controlled  federation of MFls.  Christen and Rosenberg2'  point out that experience
from  the  field  appears  to  justify  a  categorical  conclusion:  in  poor  countries,  self-supervision  of
financial  intermediaries  has  been tried dozens  of times  and  has repeatedly proven to be  ineffective,
even in the  many cases where donors provided heavy technical assistance.  One reason for the failure
of the model  is the obvious conflict  of interest that arises.  The inmuediate  benefit to the participating
institutions is  not great enough  to induce them to hold a rigorous line  when problems  arise.  Most of
the experience  with self-supervision has been in federations of financial cooperatives,  but it is hard to
see any reason to expect better results from federations  of MFIs.
20  Pabst, Helmut.  "Mejores Prdcticas  en la Supervisi6n de las Cooperativas  de Ahorro y Credito  ", exposici6n en
la  Ira.  Convenci6n de  Cooperativas Ahorro  y  Credito del Pera, Lima,  Peru,  17-19  octubre del 2001.
Confederaci6n  Alemana de Cooperativas  (DGRV):  Lima, Pertu,  octubre 2001.
21  Robert P.  Christen and Richard Rosenberg.  The Rush  to Regulate:  Legal Frameworks for Microfinance.
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest  (CGAP) Occasional  Paper. CGAP: Washington, DC,  April 2000.
3098.  One means by which governments,  international  financial institutions  and donors (and,  in a few cases,
private  organizations)  are  trying  to  accelerate  the  expansion  of  microfinance  services,  is  the
establishment  of wholesale  financial  institutions,  organized  and known  variously  as  apexes,  second-
tier  banks,  national  funds,  etc.)  to  channel  financial  resources  and,  in  varying  degrees,  technical
assistance  and  overhead  support  to  rmicrofinance  retailers.22 Some  countries  may  have  an  apex
institution (usually  a national  fund) wholesaling  loans to local MFIs-typically  credit-only MFIs.  As
a principal  lender/investor,  such an apex becomes  a "virtual"  supervisory  agency:  it must evaluate
and monitor the soundness of the MFIs it lends to if it expects to have its loans  repaid.  For MFIs that
fail to meet its standards,  the sanction is denial of loans.
99.  Suggestions  have been made  from time to time  that apex  institutions  supervise deposit-taking  MFIs,
usually  under  a  delegated  supervision  arrangement  with  the  central  bank  authority.  Such  an
arrangement  might  involve  potential  conflicts  of interest:  for instance,  would  an  apex  institution
move  expeditiously  to  close  down  an  MFI  that owed  it  money?  The justification  for these  apex
institutions  often includes  an  expectation  that they will  catalyze significant quality improvements  in
the MFIs they fund, but few have been notably successful  at this task.
Lezal and Judicial  Systems for Loan Contracts  and Security Interest
100.  For  both  Ghana  and  the  Philippines,  there  are  still  major  limitations  in  the  legal  definition,
registration  and repossession of collateral  which stand in the way of providing not only greater access
to financial  services  for poor owners of microenterprises,  but also for legitimate  MEIs to gain much
needed  access  to commercial  sources  of funds  in the  formal  banking  and finance  sector.  Indonesia
shares many of these limitations  as well: one example of an obstacle to microfinance  lending is Bank
Indonesia's  administrative  regulation  that  borrowers  must  present  to  the  lending  bank  a  properly
issued Business License (NPWP) for loans of Rp.25 million or more.
101.  In  Ghana  and  the  Philippines  --  as  in  many  developing  countries  --  the  secured  transactions
framework,  viz.,  (i)  creation  (legal  definition),  (ii)  perfection  (registration),  and  (iii)  execution
(repossession) - has  emerged as  a substantial constraint  to rural credit access.  In the World Bank's
experience  in a number of countries  confronted  with these obstacles  in the legal  and judicial systems,
Economic  and Sector  Work  has  been  followed  by  technical  assistance  and lending  for help  in (a)
drafting a comprehensive  legal  framework  and (b) modernizing  registry  systems.  Addressing  these
issues can  be expected  to increase  access  to credit by facilitating  and legitimizing  direct lending by
banks  and  NBFIs  for  loans  secured  by  moveable  property,  and  by  increased  linkage  transactions
through the wholesale  and retail system secured by inventory and accounts receivables.
102.  Closely related  to  strengthening  the legal and  regulatory  framework  is  improving  the information
base for formal  commercial  as  well as rural  MFIs lenders.  To reduce risks and transaction  costs, the
design of  rural microfinance projects should support steps to provide accurate and timely information
regarding  collateral,  including aspects such as:  (i) expansion, modernization  and unification  of public
registries,  particularly  for  land;  (ii)  improvement  and  modernization  of  titling  and  registration
procedures;  and  (iii)  promotion  of  credit  bureaus  and rating  services  particularly  to provide  better
information about potential institutional borrowers such as SHGs and NGOs.
22  Fred  Levy,  "Apex Institutions in Microfinance  ", The World Bank:  Washington, DC, June 12, 2000 (Draft).
31ANNEx:  OVERALL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR RURAL/MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS - INDONESIA
Established under  Authorized  Government Agency
Tvpe of MFI  Ownership  Form of Organization  Law No.  Activities  with Jurisdiction  Regulated by  Supenised  by
Conmmercial Banks in  Private / State  Limited Liability  Law No.  10/ 1998  Full-service bank;  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia
Microfinance  Co.  KPKM and KBLI
Bank Rakyat Indonesia  State-owned  State-owned bank  Law No.  10 / 1998  Full-service  bank  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia
commercial bank
BRI Retail  Retail banking  Operating division  Full banking  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia
division of BRI  services
BRI Unit Desa  Micro banking  Operating division  Savings deposits  Micro Banking  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia
division of BRI  and micro-loans  Division - BRI  (for BRI as a  (for BRI as a
whole)  whole)
Bank Pembangunan  Provincial  Govemment  Law No.  10 /1998  Full-service bank;  Bank Indonesia;  BI; Provincial  Bank Indonesia
Daerah (BPD)  Regional  govemment  enterprise  Loans and TA  to  Provincial  Govemment
Development Banks  LDKPs  Govemment;
Ministry of Home
Affairs
Bank Perkreditan  Private parties;  Limited Liability  Law No. 10/  1998  Savings and time  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia  Bank Indonesia
Rakyat (BPRtNonBKD)  Local  Co. or Cooperative  deposits;
Rural Banks  govemments.  or Govemment  microfinance  loans
Enterprise
Badan Kredit Desa  Village-owned and  Staatsblad  Staatsblad  1929  Microcredits only  Finance Ministry;  Finance  Ministry;  BRI Branch on
(BPR BKD)  - Village  village-managed  Village Credit  BRI; Bank  BRI;  Bank  behalf of Bank
Banks and Paddy Banks  Institutions Act  Indonesia  Indonesia  Indonesia
Lembaga Dana Kredit  Local  and  Govemment  Provincial  Micro-loans only  Provincial  Provincial  Provincial
Pedesaan (LDKP) - Provincial  enterprise  (NBFI)  Govemment  govemment  BPD  BPD
Village  Rural Fund and  Govemment  Decrees;  Ministry of
Credit Institutions  Administration  Finance,  1984
BKK (Central Java)  Provincial  Govemment  Provincial Decree  Savings deposits  Provincial  Sub-district  Provincial
govemment  enterprise  (NBFI)  No. 2/  1970;  and micro-loans  government;  govemment head;  BPD
Ministry of Finance,  Ministry of Finance  Provincial  BPD
1984
LPD (Bali)  Local  villages  Govemment  Provincial Decree  Savings deposits  Badan Pembina  Audited by  BPD - Bali
(desa  adat)  enterprise  (NBFI)  No. 2 / 1988  and micro-loans  LPPD presided over  Inspektorat
by the Govemor  Wilaya Daerah
32Established under  Authorized  GorernmenA.4gency
F'pe of MIFI  Ow,nership  Form of  Organizmaion  La/wNo.  .Acllnules  idh Junrdictwon  Regulared by  Super-ised by
Unit Eknomi Desa - Village  Village enterprise  Ministry of Home  Microcredits and  Ministry of Home  Sub-district  and  Sub-district  and
Simpan Pinjan  government  Affairs  Instructions  savings  Affairs; village head +  district PMDs,  district PMDs,
(UED-SP)  No. 412/440/SJ  LKMD  national PMD  national PMD
1998
Credit Unions  Private sector  Financial  Cooperative  Govemment  Savings deposits  Ministry of Coops,  Ministry of  Ministry of Coops,
(KOPDIT)  individuals  Ordinance  No.  9 /  and micro-loans  Small/Medium  Coops,  Small/Medium
1995  (members only)  Enterprise  SmallUMedium  Enterprise
Enterprise
KOSIPA  Government-  Financial  Cooperative  Law No. 25 / 1992  Savings deposits  Ministry of Coops,  Ministry of  Ministry of Coops,
sponsored  and micro-loans  Small/ Medium  Coops,  Small/Medium
(members only)  Enterprise  Small/Medium  Enterprise
Enterprise
KUD / USP  Government-  Credit dept.  of multi-  Law No. 25 / 1992  Savings deposits  Ministry of Coops,  Ministry of  Ministry of Coops,
sponsored  purpose cooperative  and micro-loans  Small/Medium  Coops,  Small/Medium
(members only)  Enterprise  Small/Medium  Enterprise
Enterprise
Pawnshops  State-owned  Government enterprise  Pawn loans  Ministry of Finance  Ministry of Finance
NGOs  Private sector  Non=profit foundation  Promote linkages; credit delivery and loan collection
Revised and updated 2122/2001from Randhawa/Gallardo  Back To Office Report; See also: "ProFI  Microfinance Institutions Study ",  Report  preparedfor  BI-GTZ ProFl  Project, Denpasar,Bali March 2001
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